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Abstract
Studies investigating the neural bases of cognitive phenomena such as perception, attention and decision-
making increasingly employ multialternative task designs. It is essential in such designs to distinguish
the neural correlates of behavioral choices arising from changes in perceptual factors, such as enhanced
sensitivity to sensory information, from those arising from changes in decisional factors, such as a stronger
bias for a particular response or choice (choice bias). To date, such a distinction is not possible with
established approaches. Thus, there is a critical need for a theoretical approach that distinguishes the
effects of changes in sensitivity from those of changes in choice bias in multialternative tasks.
Here, we introduce a mathematical model that decouples choice bias from perceptual sensitivity
effects in multialternative detection tasks: multialternative tasks that incorporate catch trials to measure
the ability to detect one among multiple (potential) stimuli or stimulus features. By formulating the
perceptual decision in a novel, multidimensional signal detection framework, our model identifies the
distinct effects of bias and sensitivity on behavioral choices. With a combination of analytical and
numerical approaches, we demonstrate that model parameters (sensitivity, bias) are estimated reliably
and uniquely, even in tasks involving arbitrarily large numbers of alternatives.
Model simulations revealed that ignoring choice bias or performance during catch trials produced
systematically inaccurate estimates of perceptual sensitivity, a finding that has important implications
for interpreting behavioral data in multialternative detection and cued attention tasks. The model will
find important application in identifying the effects of neural perturbations (stimulation or inactivation)
on an animal’s perception in multialternative attention and decision-making tasks.
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2Author Summary
There is increasing interest in measuring the neural basis of perception and cognition with multialternative
tasks (tasks with more than two stimulus or response alternatives). Choice biases represent tendencies
(idiosyncratic or rational) to favor responses to one or a few alternatives over others. Thus, an important
challenge when interpreting behavioral data in such multialternative tasks is to infer which aspects of
behavior were driven by changes in the subject’s perception, and which by choice biases.
We have developed a mathematical model that overcomes this challenge. The model decouples the
effects of choice bias when estimating perceptual sensitivity in widely-used, multialternative detection
tasks: tasks that measure the ability to detect one among several potential stimuli or stimulus features.
We provide numerical methods for estimating choice bias from multialternative behavioral data, and
highlight key caveats for interpreting behavioral data without accounting for such bias effects. Our
model provides a powerful and widely applicable tool for analyzing the contribution of bias to behavioral
choices in human and animal studies of perception, attention and decision-making.
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4Introduction
Decisions in the real world involve making a categorical judgment or choice based on careful evaluation
of noisy sensory evidence. Besides sensory evidence, behavioral biases contribute importantly to the
decision-making process [1–3]. Biases may reflect an innate preference for a specific choice that manifests,
for instance, as an idiosyncratic tendency for selecting one choice among many equally likely alternatives
[2, 4]. Conversely, biases may be rapidly and reversibly induced with specific task manipulations. For
instance, cueing the location of an upcoming stimulus, either explicitly with a spatial cue or implicitly by
temporarily increasing the frequency of presentation at a particular location, could result in the subject
developing a bias for selecting that location over other locations in the time-span of a few trials [5–7].
Systematic biases for specific choices (“choice biases”) confound the ability to evaluate the subject’s
sensitivity to sensory evidence. Hence, in studies of human and animal behavior much effort is invested
in the careful development of experimental designs and training protocols that minimize, or train away,
biases, although this approach may not always be practical.
Theoretical frameworks provide a complementary approach for accounting for choice bias: they quan-
tify it. Such frameworks are based on a testable model of the decision-making process, and permit
principled, quantitative estimation of the contribution of choice bias to the subject’s responses. Among
such theoretical frameworks, signal detection theory (SDT) is a simple, but powerful, decision-making
framework for accounting for choice bias in binary choice tasks, such as the two-alternative forced choice
(2-AFC) or Yes/No detection tasks [3, 8].
In two-alternative (Yes/No) detection tasks, the experimenter seeks to measure a (human or animal)
subject’s perceptual sensitivity to detect a stimulus or a stimulus feature in the display. The subject is
presented with a series of behavioral trials; the stimulus (or stimulus feature) is presented on a random
subset of these trials and is absent in others. When the stimulus is detected the subject reports it with
a “Yes” response; otherwise, the subject reports a “No” response. Signal detection theory models the
subject’s perceptual decision as an inherently noisy process. In the SDT framework for the binary choice
(Yes/No) task, the subject decides between the two, mutually exclusive events (was the stimulus present,
or not?) by weighing the sensory evidence for each (Figure 2A). The decision is based on a latent random
variable, the decision variable (Ψ), whose mean depends on the strength of the sensory evidence, and
whose variance arises from the noisiness of the sensory evidence across trials [8]. On trials in which the
decision variable (Ψ) falls above a cutoff value (c, Figure 2A, red vertical line), the subject reports having
detected the stimulus (“Yes”).
The cutoff value or “choice criterion” (c) represents the subject’s bias for choosing to report one event
over the other. When the subject is highly biased toward the “Yes” choice, she/he(/it) adopts a low
value for the choice criterion which manifests as a tendency to guess at detection, i.e., to report having
detected the stimulus even when no stimulus was presented (a high rate of “false-alarms”). Conversely,
when the subject is highly biased toward the “No” choice, she/he adopts a high criterion which manifests
as a conservative tendency to not report detection even on trials when the stimulus was presented (a high
rate of “misses”). Having accounted for the subject’s tendency to guess (bias), the subject’s “perceptual
sensitivity” (denoted d) to detect the stimulus is analytically inferred from the proportion of false-alarms
and misses based on assumptions about the nature of the decision variable distribution [8].
Now, consider the following scenario: an experimenter seeks to measure a subject’s perceptual sensi-
tivity for detecting stimuli at not one, but two different locations (Figure 1A). To accomplish this, let the
experimenter employ a two-alternative forced choice design (2-AFC), so that instead of the “No” response,
the subject reports one of the two locations at which the stimulus was presented (Figure 1A, upper).
2-AFC designs (and m-alternative forced-choice designs, in general) present an important limitation for
measuring detection sensitivity in such tasks: the potential confound introduced by a “guessing” strategy.
For instance, if the subject were highly sensitive to detecting the stimulus at one of the two locations (say
location 1), she/he(/it) could use the strategy of “guessing” that the stimulus was presented at location
52 when no stimulus was detected at location 1. In this sense, the subject’s responses are not indicative
of detecting the stimulus at location 2 and, hence, cannot be used to estimate perceptual sensitivity for
detection at location 2.
To overcome this limitation, in addition to offering two or more stimulus alternatives, experimental
designs include “catch” (stimulus absent) trials [9–13]. In such trials, no stimulus is presented or no
actionable sensory evidence is available, and the subject is rewarded for not making a response (commonly
called NoGo, analogous to the “No” response in the Yes/No task; Figure 1A, lower). Measuring false-
alarm rates (the proportion of guesses) during such catch trials identifies and controls for a subject’s
guessing strategy. Thus, catch trials are, in general, necessary for multialternative tasks that seek to
measure detection sensitivity at multiple spatial locations or to multiple potential values of a stimulus
attribute (e.g., to different colors or stimulus orientations). We term such a task for measuring detection
performance with multiple stimulus/response alternatives and catch trials a “multiple alternative (or
multialternative) detection task”.
Despite its considerable success with accounting for choice bias in 2-AFC and Yes/No tasks, con-
ventional SDT cannot readily be applied to tasks with more than two alternatives. Yet, accounting for
bias in such multialternative detection tasks (with catch trials) remains an important, open problem [14]
(pp.250-251) [15]. Here, we introduce a multidimensional signal detection model to decouple choice bias
from perceptual sensitivity in multialternative detection tasks. We develop analytical and numerical
approaches for estimating perceptual (detection) sensitivity and choice criteria from measured response
probabilities, and highlight key caveats with ignoring choice bias when interpreting behavior in multial-
ternative detection tasks. Our model provides a general and powerful framework for inferring an animal’s
perception from its behavior in multialternative attention and decision-making tasks.
Results
The multialternative detection task: motivation for a multidimensional model
We develop a multidimensional signal detection model to decouple choice bias from perceptual sensitivity
in multialternative detection tasks (with catch trials). For brevity, we will refer to such tasks as m-ADC
tasks. To facilitate development of the model we choose a particular kind of simple detection task, a
multiple alternative spatial detection task (Figure 1A). The theory is applicable to other kinds of task
designs as well, such as those involving the detection of a change in a stimulus feature (e.g. orientation;
Figure 1B) employed by previous studies [9, 10,12].
In this spatial detection m-ADC task, a subject is presented with a briefly-flashed stimulus that can
occur at one (or none) of several potential spatial locations (Figure 1A). Trials in which a stimulus was
presented are termed “stimulus trials”, whereas trials in which no stimulus was presented are termed “catch
trials”. The subject reports the location at which s/he perceived the stimulus, for instance with a saccadic
eye movement (Figure 1A, top sequence). In case no stimulus was detected (e.g. during catch trials),
the subject is rewarded for making a NoGo response (Figure 1A, bottom sequence). Incorporating catch
trials and NoGo responses makes the m-ADC task a more general version of multialternative forced-choice
(m-AFC) task.
To motivate the development of the multidimensional model for the m-ADC task, we first demonstrate
why the task cannot be modeled with multiple one-dimensional binary choice models. First, consider a
binary choice (Yes/No) spatial detection task (Figure 2A). In this task, the stimulus is presented either
at a location (location 1) or not at all (catch). Conventional SDT models the binary (Yes/No) decision
as a process of selecting one of two hypotheses (h0: no stimulus or h1: stimulus at location 1) based
on their relative likelihoods, given the sensory evidence. The decision variable (Ψ), proportional to the
likelihood ratio of the hypotheses, is modeled as a Gaussian random variable with unit variance. The
subject chooses h1 if the decision variable exceeds a particular value, the criterion; such a specification
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Figure 1. Multialternative detection task. (A) Two-alternative detection (2-ADC) task. The
subject initiates a trial by fixating on a zeroing dot. On some trials (“stimulus” trials, upper sequence),
a target stimulus (here, a grating) is briefly presented at one of two potential locations (dashed black
circles) on the screen. The subject is rewarded for detecting and indicating the location of the target
with a saccade (blue line, “Go” response) to the appropriate response box (dashed yellow circles). On
other trials, (“catch” trials, lower sequence), no target is presented for a prolonged period following
fixation. In these trials, the subject is rewarded for maintaining fixation on the zeroing dot (“NoGo”
response) following the appearance of the response boxes. (B) Multialternative change detection
(m-ADC) task. Following fixation of a central dot, the subject is presented with m (here, m=4)
oriented gratings. At a random time following stimulus onset, the display goes blank briefly (∼300 ms).
Then, the four stimuli reappear. On most of the trials, one of the four gratings has changed in
orientation (change trials), and on the remaining trials none of the stimuli changed (catch trials). The
subject is rewarded for saccading to the location of the change (change trials) or for maintaining
fixation on trials when no change occurred (catch trials).
permits maximizing accuracy by scaling the value of the criterion to match the ratio of the priors (for a
detailed discussion, see [8]). The well-known 2 × 2 contingency table for this type of task is shown in
Table S1A.
Based on the proportion of hits (HR) – the proportion of trials in which the subject correctly reported
a detection when a stimulus was presented – and false-alarms (FA) – the proportion of trials in which
the subject incorrectly reported a detection when no stimulus was presented – SDT provides a simple,
one-dimensional formalism for estimating the subject’s “perceptual sensitivity” and “choice criterion”.
Perceptual sensitivity, d = Φ−1(HR)−Φ−1(FA), represents a measure of the discriminability (or overlap)
of the decision variable distributions for the two hypotheses, and the “choice criterion”, c = Φ−1(FA), a
measure of bias for choosing one hypothesis over the other (where Φ−1 represents the probit function,
the inverse cumulative distribution function associated with the standard normal distribution).
Let us now consider the 2-ADC task where the stimulus can be presented at one of two locations, in
addition to not being presented at all (Figure 1A). The 3x3 contingency table for this task is shown in
Table S1B. For this task, the decision must be made among three hypotheses: h1, stimulus at location
1; h2, stimulus at location 2; or h0, no stimulus at either location.
Such a two-alternative detection task cannot be modeled as two Yes/No detection tasks executed in
parallel with two independent binary choice detection models. To illustrate why, let us attempt to model
the responses in such a task with two one-dimensional SDT models, one for each of the two locations
(Figure 2B). As shown in the figure, the “noise” (Ψ|h0) distribution at each location (black) is modeled
as a unit-variance Gaussian that represents the distribution of the decision variable during no-stimulus
7(catch) trials. The “signal” distribution at each location k, (Ψ|hk) corresponds to a translated version
of the noise distribution (with a higher mean value) at that location. The perceptual sensitivity at each
location k, dk, is quantified as the difference between the means of the signal and noise distributions at
that location (for noise standard deviation of unity; see next section for details). On a given trial, the
subject reports a Go response at location k if the decision variable at that location exceeds the choice
criterion, ck; if the decision variable does not exceed the choice criterion at either location, the subject
reports a NoGo response.
We now estimate perceptual sensitivity and choice criterion for each location with this pair of inde-
pendent, one-dimensional models. As per this model, the false alarm rate at, say, location 1 (FA1, the
probability of incorrectly reporting a stimulus at location 1 when no stimulus was presented; hatched area
in Figure 2B) determines the choice criterion (c1) at this location (c1 = Φ−1(FA1), as before). Similarly,
the hit rate at location 1 (HR1, the probability of correctly reporting a stimulus at location 1 when it was
presented at that location, red shaded area in Figure 2B), in conjunction with the false-alarm rate (FA1),
determines the perceptual sensitivity (d1) at this location (d1 = Φ−1(HR1)− Φ−1(FA1)). The criterion
and sensitivity at location 2 may be similarly estimated based on the hit-rate (HR2) and false-alarm
rate (FA2) at location 2. Note that when analyzed in this way (as a pair of one-dimensional models),
parameters (d and c) at each location are estimated independently of responses at the other location.
Although intuitively appealing, such a model has the following major drawbacks. First, under this
model, the miss-rate at location k (the probability of giving a NoGo response when a stimulus was
presented at location k) is exactly the complement of the hit rate at location k (MRk = 1−HRk). Thus,
the model cannot deal with the scenario in which the animal responds to a location that is different
from the location at which the stimulus was presented (shaded squares, Table S1B). Second, such a
model duplicates the specification of the correct-rejection rate, the complement of the false-alarm rate
at each location (CRk = 1− FAk, grey shaded area, Figure 2B), whereas the observed correct rejection
rate (probability of giving a NoGo response when no stimulus was presented at either location) is, by
definition, a unique quantity. Third, the model specifies that the animal will respond to the location at
which the decision variable exceeds criterion. What if decision variables were to exceed criteria at both
locations on a particular trial? This causes a decision conflict in the model, because responses cannot
be made to more than one location on a given trial. These drawbacks demonstrate that, two-alternative
(or, in general, multialternative) detection tasks cannot be analyzed with two (or multiple) independent
one-dimensional binary choice signal detection models.
Two-dimensional signal detection model for the two-alternative detection (2-
ADC) task
We develop a multidimensional model, first, for a two alternative detection task (Figure 1A) and in a
later section generalize the model to a task with several alternatives (m > 2). We briefly describe the
model below, and provide a detailed analytical formulation in later sections.
In our two-dimensional signal detection model, independent decision variables represent stimuli at
each location along orthogonal perceptual dimensions (Figure 2C). When no stimulus is presented (catch
trials), the joint distribution of decision variables (the “noise” distribution) is centered at the origin, with
equal variance along each perceptual dimension (Figure 2C, black). A stimulus presented at a particular
location translates the noise distribution along the perceptual dimension (decision variable axis) for
that location (the “signal” distribution; Figure 2C, red or blue). The magnitude of this translation is
inversely related to the overlap between the signal and noise distributions, and is defined as the perceptual
sensitivity (dk) for each location, k.
The model posits that, while choosing a response, the subject employs an independent choice criterion
(ck) for each location: on each trial a response is made to the location at which the decision variable
exceeds the choice criterion. A difference in criteria between the two locations gives rise to a choice bias
8(relative preference) for one location over the other. If decision variables at both locations exceed their
respective criteria, the response is made to the location at which the difference between the decision
variable and the corresponding choice criterion was the greatest. If no decision variable exceeds its
respective criterion, the subject abstains from responding (or gives a NoGo response; Figure 2C, Y=0,
gray shaded region). Under this model, the response probability for each stimulus contingency is directly
related to the proportion (integral) of the corresponding joint distribution within its decision boundary.
This multidimensional 2-ADCmodel overcomes the drawbacks of the (aforementioned) multiple binary
choice model formulation (Figure 2B). First, this model captures the possibility that the subject could
respond to a location that is different from the stimulus location (Table S1B, shaded cells); the probability
of such a response is given by the proportion of the signal distribution for a stimulus at a location (e.g.,
Figure 2C; red distribution) that lies within the decision boundary for a response at a different location
(e.g., Y=2 decision boundary). Second, the probability of a correct rejection is uniquely specified; this
corresponds to the proportion of the noise distribution that lies within the decision boundary of the
NoGo response (Figure 2C; gray shaded area). Third, the decision rule specifies a clear response for the
scenario in which the decision variable exceeds criterion at both locations. Our formulation of the model
that incorporates catch trials and NoGo responses is more general and subsumes previous models for
multialternative forced-choice tasks that do not (Appendix B, Supporting Information).
2-ADC latent variable formulation
We formulate the 2-ADC model analytically building upon a recently developed latent variable formula-
tion [15]. This formulation involves specifying a structural model of the subject’s perceptual sensitivity
for detecting the presented stimulus, and a decision rule that models the effect of choice bias on the sub-
ject’s response. In the Discussion, we analyze the assumptions inherent in this formulation and discuss
potential extensions.
We denote the subject’s response with the variable Y : Y = i indicates that the subject chose to
respond at location i (Go response) whereas Y = 0 indicates that the subject gave a NoGo response.
Similarly, the presentation of stimulus at location i is denoted by the variable Xi: Xi = 1 indicates that
a stimulus presented at location i. We further stipulate that no more than one stimulus be presented on
a given trial, a common practice in psychophysics tasks as well as in all tasks employed in this study.
Thus,
m∑
k=1
Xk = 1 (stimulus trial) or 0 (catch trial).
The structural model for 2-ADC task independently distributed decision variables Ψi for each of the
two locations, and specifies how these distributions change for each stimulus condition:
Ψ1 = d1X1 + ε1
Ψ2 = d2X2 + ε2 (1)
where Ψi denotes the decision variable at location i, εi is a random variable that represents the distri-
bution of Ψi when no stimulus is present, di represents the change in the expected value of the decision
variable when a stimulus is presented at location i (vs. when no stimulus is present); in other words,
di = E(Ψi|Xi = 1) − E(Ψi|Xi = 0). Note that in this formulation each Ψi can be considered a compo-
nent of a bivariate random variable (Ψ) represented in a two-dimensional, Cartesian, perceptual/decision
space (Figure 2C).
The distribution of Ψi when a stimulus is present at location i (Xi = 1) is termed the “signal”
distribution; its distribution when no stimulus is present (Xi = 0) is termed the “noise” distribution, and
is identical with the distribution of εi.
In line with conventional SDT, the 2-ADC structural model posits that a stimulus shifts the mean of
the noise distribution (additively) without altering its variance or higher moments. Conventional SDT
also assumes that the noise distribution is unit normal (zero-mean Gaussian with unit variance). If the
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Figure 2. Signal detection models for the multialternative detection task. (A) A
two-alternative forced choice (Yes/No) task modeled with a one-dimensional signal detection model.
Black Gaussian: noise distribution: red Gaussian: signal distribution; red shading: hit-rate; gray
shading: correct rejection rate; hatched region: false-alarm rate; d1: perceptual sensitivity for detecting
the stimulus at location 1; c1: choice criterion for a response to location 1. (B) Performance in a
2-ADC task modeled with two binary choice (Yes/No) one-dimensional models, one at each potential
target location. The subject employs independent choice criteria (c1, c2) at each location (red and blue
vertical lines, respectively) while making a decision to respond in one of three ways: saccade to location
1, to location 2, or to withhold response (NoGo) (see text for details). (C) Multidimensional signal
detection model for the 2-ADC task. The decision variable at each stimulus location (Ψ1,Ψ2) are
represented along orthogonal axes in perceptual decision space. Decision variables are independently
distributed. Black circle: schematic representation of a contour of the joint decision variable
distribution for no stimulus at either location (noise distribution). Red circle: joint distribution of the
decision variables for a stimulus at location 1. Blue circle: joint distribution of the decision variables for
a stimulus at location 2. Linear decision boundaries (thick black lines) specify the domain of values of
the decision variables for each potential response or choice. The integral of the decision variable
distribution enclosed by each decision boundary represents the probability of the corresponding
response: NoGo (Y=0, gray), Go response to location 1 (Y=1, red) or to location 2 (Y=2, blue).
Marginal distributions of each decision variable are also shown alongside each axis.
noise distributions at the two locations are zero-mean Gaussian but have unequal variances, the 2-ADC
structural model with unit normal noise distributions (1) can be readily recovered upon scaling each
decision variable by the standard deviation of the appropriate noise distribution (σi).
The terminology for di deserves careful mention. di measures the difference between the expected
values of the signal and noise distributions, and is hence a measure of signal strength. When measured in
units of noise standard deviation (σi), di is a measure of the overlap between signal and noise distributions
and, hence, an index of discriminability for these distributions. In a behavioral context, it is a measure
of the subject’s sensitivity for detecting the signal from a noisy background. For the purposes of this
study, we will refer to di as perceptual sensitivity with the understanding that di is measured in units of
noise standard deviation.
The SDT decision rule for a binary choice (Yes/No) task specifies that the subject reports a detection
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(“Yes” response) if the decision variable exceeds a cutoff value, known as a choice criterion (c). The
2-ADC decision rule extends the one-dimensional SDT decision rule by specifying choice criteria for each
location:
Y = 1, if Ψ1 > c1 ∩ Ψ1 − c1 > Ψ2 − c2
Y = 2, if Ψ2 > c2 ∩ Ψ2 − c2 > Ψ1 − c1 (2)
Y = 0, if Ψ1 ≤ c1 ∩ Ψ2 ≤ c2
Thus, the subject makes a response at location i when the decision variable Ψi exceeds choice criterion
ci. If the Ψi-s exceed the choice criterion at both locations, then the subject responds to the location
with the larger difference between decision variable and criterion values (larger Ψi − ci). On the other
hand, if Ψi-s fall below the choice criterion at every location, then the subject makes a NoGo response.
The decision rule is depicted in Figure 2C (thick black lines). In a later section, we demonstrate how
this rule can be derived from optimal decision theory (for the more general m-alternative case). Note
that both sensitivities and criteria are measured in the same units: the assumption of unit normal noise is
made with the understanding that both di-s and c− i-s are measured in units of noise standard deviation.
These choice criteria ci constitute an SDT measure of bias. The relative value of the criteria between
locations indicates the magnitude of the bias: a lower choice criterion at a location corresponds to a
greater choice bias for that location.
In order to measure the contribution of bias to the observed responses, an analytical relationship must
be formulated between the criteria, sensitivities and response probabilities. The structural model and
decision rule permit establishing such a relationship. Here, we summarize the dependence of response
probabilities on sensitivities and criteria; the detailed derivation is provided in the Methods.
The following system of equations constitute the 2-ADC model.
p(Y = i|Xi, Xj) =
∫ ∞
ci−diXi
Fj(ei + diXi − djXj − (ci − cj)) fi(ei) dei
p(Y = 0|Xi, Xj) = Fi(ci − diXi) Fj(cj − djXj)
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j
(3)
where p(Y = i|Xi, Xj) represents the conditional probability of a Go response to location i, for a
particular stimulus contingency (Xi, Xj), and p(Y = 0|Xi, Xj) represents the conditional probability of
a NoGo response for the given stimulus contingency in the 2-ADC task; fi and Fi represent, respectively,
the probability density function and the cumulative density function of the noise distribution εi at location
i, i ∈ {1, 2}.
Generalization to the multiple alternative detection (m-ADC) task
The multiple alternative (m-alternative) detection task is an extension of the 2-ADC task that permits
more than two Go response alternatives along with the NoGo response alternative. We formulate the
model next.
m-ADC latent variable formulation
The formulation of the m-ADC model is conceptually similar to that of the 2-ADC model. We estimate
the criterion and sensitivity at each location based on a structural model and decision rule that are
extensions of their 2-ADC counterparts.
The m-ADC structural model is defined as follows:
Ψi = diXi + εi εi ∼ N (0, 1) i ∈ {1, 2, . . .m} (4)
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The m-ADC decision rule is defined as follows:
Y = i if Ψi > ci ∩
(Ψi − ci) = max(Ψ1 − c1,Ψ2 − c2, . . . ,Ψm − cm)
= 0 if ∩k Ψk ≤ ck (5)
Thus, the subject gives a Go response to the location at which the decision variable exceeds the choice
criterion at that location, and at which the difference between the decision variable and the corresponding
choice criterion is maximal. If the decision variable does not exceed the choice criterion at any location,
the subject gives a NoGo response.
As with the 2-ADC model, each Ψi in the m-ADC model can be considered an independent component
of a multivariate (random) decision variable (Ψ) represented in a multi-dimensional perceptual space. In
addition, the assumption of orthogonality (independence) among the perceptual dimensions implies that
the covariance matrix of this decision variable is a diagonal matrix.
As before, the structural model and decision rule permit establishing the relationship between sensi-
tivity, criteria and m-ADC response probabilities (derived in the Methods).
p(Y = i|X) =
∫ ∞
ci−diXi
∏
k,k 6=i
Fk(ei + diXi − dkXk − ci + ck) fi(ei) dei (6)
where, as before p(Y = i|X) represents the conditional probability of a Go response to location i, for a
particular stimulus contingency (X)), and p(Y = 0|X) represents the conditional probability of a NoGo
response for the given stimulus contingency in the m-ADC task; fi and Fi represent, respectively, the
probability density function and the cumulative density function of the noise distribution εi at location
i, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
The system of equations (6) corresponds to m2 +m independent observations from which the criteria
and sensitivities at each location may be determined.
In the m-ADC task, m2 +m independent probabilities are determined by just 2m parameters corre-
sponding to the criterion and sensitivity at each of the m locations. Thus, for the m-ADC case (m > 2),
there are far more equations than parameters compared to the 2-ADC case. Hence, there are more
observations for internal tests of model validity.
Parameter estimation, uniqueness, and optimality
In the two alternative forced choice (2-AFC) task, perceptual sensitivity and choice criteria are readily
estimated analytically, as these quantities occur as linear terms of the argument of an invertible probit
function [8]. Moreover, the specification of a criterion (or cut-off value) in the 2-AFC model is Bayes
optimal in terms of maximizing reward or the proportion of correct responses [16].
On the other hand, the potential for multiple stimulus contingencies (m > 2) and catch trials renders
the m-ADC model multidimensional (Figure 2C) and raises several challenges. First, in this multidimen-
sional SDT model, the system of equations (6) is not readily invertible analytically. Thus, given a set of
experimentally observed m-ADC responses (e.g, contingency table, Table S1B), is it possible to solve the
system of equations (6) to estimate the underlying perceptual sensitivity and choice criterion for each
location? Second, having estimated these parameters, can one guarantee uniqueness, so that only one
set of parameters is consistent with a given set of response probabilities? Finally, can one show that the
specification of independent criteria at each location (linear, intersecting decision surfaces, Figure 2C)
constitutes an optimal decision rule? We addressed these challenges with a combination of numerical and
analytical approaches.
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Figure 3. Likelihood landscape for the 2-ADC model. (A) Contour plot of the 2-ADC
multinomial log-likelihood as a function of the sensitivities (d1, d2) at the two locations. (B) Contour
plot of the 2-ADC multinomial log-likelihood as a function of the criteria (c1, c2). The convexity of the
function is apparent throughout the domain shown. (C) The variation of log-likelihood with sensitivity
each location for fixed values of the other parameters (sensitivity at the other location and the two
criteria, cross section through the dashed white lines of panels A-B). Dashed gray lines: values of the
parameters that maximize the log-likelihood function; red data: location 1; blue data: location 2. (D)
Same as panel C, but variation with the criterion at each location for fixed values of the other
parameters (criterion at the other location, and the two sensitivities).
Estimating m-ADC model parameters
We employed numerical methods to estimate m-ADC model parameters, sensitivities and criteria, based
on m-ADC response probabilities. We demonstrate parameter recovery with the 2-ADC model; the
procedure can be readily extended to the m-ADC case.
The shape of the likelihood function is key to identifying the effectiveness of numerical approaches
for parameter estimation, and for identifying the uniqueness of the underlying parameters. Responses to
each alternative for each stimulus contingency (n(Y = i|Xi, Xj)) were assumed to follow a multinomial
distribution. We depict the four-dimensional likelihood function in a pair of two-dimensional subspaces
by holding ci-s constant and varying di-s or vice versa (Figure 3A-B, parameter values in Table S2A). In
the domain of parameter values shown in the figure, the likelihood function appears to be convex (Figure
3A-D) indicating a single minimum corresponding to a unique set of underlying parameters.
As proof-of-concept of parameter recovery, simulated data were provided as input to the algorithm
in lieu of experimental data. Simulated data were generated as follows: response probabilities were
computed from (3) based on a prespecified set of criteria and sensitivities (Table S2A). We denote the
response probabilities as Prs . Based on these probabilities, response counts for each stimulus-response
contingency were generated with random sampling. This procedure was repeated for 20 simulated runs
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with 100 trials for each of the two stimulus conditions, and 200 catch trials per run (a total of N=4000
trials in 20 runs). The resulting total response counts, Ors (Table S2B) were provided to numerical
optimization algorithms for parameter recovery.
We employed two approaches: (i) maximum likelihood estimation with a line-search (ML-LS) algo-
rithm or (ii) Bayesian estimation based on Markov Chain Monte Carlo approach with the Metropolis
algorithm (MCMC, Methods). The ML-LS line-search algorithm is an efficient approach for maximum-
likelihood estimation, but could converge onto a local extremum of the objective function. The MCMC
algorithm, although comparatively slower, has a component of stochastic sampling (Methods), and hence,
a better chance of finding global minima. In addition, errorbars computed with the MCMC approach
provide independent confirmation of the parameter standard errors computed with the ML-LS algorithm.
Both the ML-LS and MCMC algorithms converged reliably onto identical values of the four parameters
for various initial guesses (Table S2C). Figure 4A-B and 4C-D show the convergence of the ML-LS and
MCMC algorithms, respectively, for various initial guesses of the four parameters {di, ci}, i ∈ {1, 2}. The
search trajectory in four-dimensional space is depicted as 2 two-dimensional trajectories, one for each
pair of criterion and sensitivity parameters. The MCMC algorithm required an initial burn-in period
(about 500 iterations, Figure 4E), to converge to a stable parameter set; the χ2 error value reduced and
the log-likelihood value increased systematically over successive (Figure 4F). The posterior distribution
was generated with the parameter values from the last 1000 iterations, well after the burn-in period of
the MCMC algorithm (Figure 4G, Methods). Error estimates of the parameters were also highly similar
between the two estimation approaches (Table S2C).
Thus, the 2-ADC model (3) can be readily solved numerically to estimate independently the sensi-
tivities and criteria from observed response counts in the contingency table. In addition, the reliable
convergence to a unique set of parameters (Figure 4A-D) indicates a single maximum of the likelihood
function (Figure 3).
Uniqueness of m-ADC model parameters
In the previous section, we demonstrated that criterion and sensitivity at each location may be estimated,
with numerical approaches, from the response probabilities. The ability to reliably recover an identical set
of parameters with both the ML-LS and MCMC algorithms for various initial values of parameter guesses
suggests that the solution to the system of equations (6) is unique. However, the equations (6) are non-
linear integral equations, and we must entertain the possibility that multiple parameter configurations
may be consistent with a given set of response probabilities. Is the solution to system (6), corresponding
to the estimated set of criteria and sensitivities, unique?
We addressed this question analytically. We illustrate the approach with the 2-ADC model, and then
extend this to the m-ADC model.
Consider the effect of varying sensitivities and criteria on response probabilities in the 2-ADC model.
Each of the nine response probabilities in the model (3) is a function of the four parameters: the criterion
and sensitivity at each of the two locations. Thus, each response probability constitutes a surface in four-
dimensional parameter space ({di, ci}, i ∈ {1, 2}). To facilitate representation, we examined a pair of
two-dimensional subspaces by varying the criteria holding the sensitivities constant (parameter values in
Table S2A), and vice versa. In line with conventional SDT, noise was assumed to be normally distributed
with zero-mean and unit variance.
The task specification requires that no more than one stimulus be presented on a given trial (see
Section 1). This permits us to employ the following notational short-hand for the response probabilities:
p(Y = i|Xj = 1) = pij , where the superscript denotes the response location and the subscript denote the
stimulus location.
Figure 5A illustrates the effect of varying criterion ci at each location (i ∈ {1, 2}), on the response
probabilities at a particular location say, location 1. The following general trends are apparent from the
figure: A higher choice criterion at a location i (lower bias toward location i) reduces the probability of
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Figure 4. Estimating sensitivities and criteria from simulated 2-ADC responses. (A-B)
Maximum likelihood estimation of the perceptual sensitivity (A) and choice criterion (B) at each
location from simulated response counts in the two-alternative detection task (Table S2B). Beginning
with an initial guess for each parameter, the algorithm uses a line-search method to identify the
sensitivities and criteria that maximize the likelihood of the simulated response counts. For various
initial guesses (colored diamonds-s), the MLE algorithm converged reliably onto identical values of
sensitivity and criterion values at each location (black circles/dashed gray lines). (C-D) Markov-chain
Monte-Carlo (MCMC, Metropolis sampling) algorithm for estimating perceptual sensitivity (C) and
choice criterion (D) at each location from simulated 2-ADC responses (same as in panels A-B). For
various initial guesses (colored diamonds-s), the Markov chain converged reliably to identical values of
sensitivity and criterion at each location (black circles). Colored lines: Markov chains during MCMC
runs for different initial guesses. (E) Evolution of the values of sensitivity (upper panel) or criterion
(lower panel) at each location during a particular MCMC run (magenta data in panels C-D) for location
1 (red) or location 2 (blue). Gray bar: burn-in period (1000 iterations). (F) The chi-squared error
function (upper panel) decreased steadily, and the log-likelihood increased (lower panel) over successive
iterations of the MCMC run. (G) Stationary (posterior) distributions (circles) of the sensitivity (left
panel) and criterion (right panel) values at each location for the MCMC run (panel E). These
distributions were used to construct standard errors and 95% credible intervals for the parameters
(Table S2C). Red data: location 1; blue data: location 2. Lines: Gaussian fits to each distribution.
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response at that location (pik) and enhances the probability of response at the opposite location (p
j
k, j 6= i),
regardless of where the stimulus is presented (i, j, k ∈ {1, 2}).
Also apparent is the effect of sensitivity (di) on response probabilities: Greater sensitivity to a stimulus
at a location enhances the hit-rate at that location (Figure 5B, red), and reduces the probability of a
false alarm (incorrect response) at the opposite location (Figure 5B, blue).
The monotonic dependence of the response probabilities on each criterion and sensitivity is analytically
formulated in Lemmas 1-3 (see below) and demonstrated in the Appendices A.1-A.3. These monotonic
relationships permitted us to establish that a given set of response probabilities uniquely determines the
underlying sensitivities and criteria in the 2-ADC model.
I. Uniqueness of 2-ADC sensitivities and criteria
In this section, we demonstrate that the set of parameters {di, ci}, i ∈ {1, 2} constitute a unique solution
of the system of equations (3), i.e. they uniquely determine the 2-ADC response probabilities. In the
previous section, we conjectured that the 2-ADC likelihood function is convex over the entire domain
of sensitivity and criteria (for a Gaussian noise distribution) indicating a unique, global minimum: a
potential approach is, then, to demonstrate analytically the convexity of the likelihood function (Figure
3). Such a demonstration is necessarily tied to a specific choice of likelihood function and noise distribution
(f). Here, we employ a different approach, based on analytical reasoning and mathematical induction,
that is free of these assumptions.
The proof proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we demonstrate the uniqueness of the choice criteria.
In the second step, we build upon the previous result to demonstrate the uniqueness of the perceptual
sensitivities.
I-A. Uniqueness of the 2-ADC criteria First we consider the system of response probabilities when
no stimulus was presented, i.e. false-alarm rates at each location during catch trials (as mentioned before,
we use pi0 as a notational shorthand for p(Y = i|Xi = 0, Xj = 0)):
p10 =
∫ ∞
c1
F2(e1 − c1 + c2) f1(e1) de1
p20 =
∫ ∞
c2
F1(e2 − c2 + c1) f2(e2) de2 (7)
We demonstrate that if a solution (c1, c2) of the system exists, then the solution is unique. The
analytical proof rests on the following lemmas:
Lemma 1 pi0(ci, cj) is a monotonically decreasing function of ci and a monotonically in-
creasing function of cj , i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.
Lemma 2 p00 is a monotonically increasing function of both c1 and c2. Specifically,
p00 = F1(c1) F2(c2).
Simply put, these lemmas assert that response probabilities vary monotonically as a function of choice
criteria. The proof of these lemmas is provided in Appendices A.1-A.2 (Supporting Information). The
proof assumes no specific form for the functions f1 and f2; only that they are continuous and supported
over the entire domain of integration. Upon rearrangement of the identity in Lemma 2:
Fi(ci) = p
0
0/Fj(cj) i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j (8)
The sequence of arguments for the proof follows:
(i) Let (c1, c2) be a particular solution for a given value Pi0 of pi0. Assume that there exists another
solution (c′1, c′2), such that at least one c′i is distinct from ci.
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(ii) Without loss of generality, let c1 > c′1.
(iii) From Lemma 1,
c1 > c
′
1 ⇒ p10(c1, c2) = P10 < p10(c′1, c2). Similarly,
c1 > c
′
1 ⇒ p20(c1, c2) = P20 > p20(c′1, c2).
(iv) Hence, it follows that c′2 > c2 for constant Pi0. In other words, if one choice criterion increases, the
other must also increase to keep p10 constant.
(v) Being cumulative distribution functions, Fi-s are monotonic functions of their arguments. Thus,
F (c1) > F (c
′
1)⇔ c1 > c′1.
(vi) From Lemma 2, (equation (8)), and point (v) above: c1 > c′1 ⇒ c′2 < c2 for constant P00 . In other
words, if one choice criterion increases, the other must decrease to keep p00 constant.
The proof follows by contradiction.
I-B. Uniqueness of the 2-ADC sensitivities Next, we demonstrate that a unique solution (c1, c2) of
the system of equations (7) corresponding to response probabilities in the no-stimulus condition implies
a unique solution (d1, d2) of the system of equations corresponding to response probabilities when a
stimulus was presented.
For a stimulus presented at location i, response probabilities at location i are given by (refer equations
(39) and (40)):
p11 =
∫ ∞
c1−d1
F2(e1 + d1 − c1 + c2) f1(e1) de1 (9)
p22 =
∫ ∞
c2−d2
F1(e2 + d2 − c2 + c1) f2(e2) de2 (10)
The proof rests on the following lemma, which is proved in Appendix A.3 (Supporting Information):
Lemma 3 pij(di, dj) is a strictly monotonic function of its arguments (di, dj), i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6=
j.
The sequence of arguments for the proof follows:
(i) Based on the previous section, we have already established a unique pair of criteria (c1, c2) that
satisfies two out of the six equations of system (3). Thus, the criteria are fixed based on the response
probabilities during catch trials (false alarms and correct rejections).
(ii) Given a particular (c1, c2), each of the probabilities, p11 and p22, in the above system of equations is
only a function of its respective di, i ∈ {1, 2}.
(iii) By Lemma 3, pii is a strictly monotonic function of its respective di.
(iv) Strict monotonicity of each function implies that the transformation from the sensitivity to the
response probability is invertible. Thus, if di uniquely determines pii then, pii uniquely determines a
di. In other words, there is a one-to-one mapping between the pii-s and the di-s.
(v) Hence, there is a unique solution di that satisfies each of these equations.
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We have shown that given a set of choice criteria, there is a unique set of sensitivity parameters that
satisfy (3). In the previous section, we showed that the choice criteria are also unique. Thus, the set of
parameters {di, ci}, i ∈ {1, 2} constitute a unique solution of the system of equations (3). This completes
the proof.
A geometric intuition for the proof may be obtained from Figure 2C by attempting to vary the criteria
c1 and c2 and observing the effect on the response probabilities to each alternative Y = 0, 1, 2. These
response probabilities correspond to the area under the joint probability distribution of Ψ1 and Ψ2 in
each of the three decision regions.
To illustrate this intuition, consider the response probabilities in the 2-ADC parameter space of criteria
during catch trials (Figure 5C, d1 = d2 = 0). The sets of all possible pairs of choice criteria that could
determine the probability of each type of response during catch trials (locus of variation of c1 and c2 for
specific values of pi0) are shown in Figures 5C-D (colored contours; i = 1, red; i = 2, blue; i = 0; green).
Note that the three contours intersect at exactly one point in the c1 − c2 plane (Figure 5D), indicating
that exactly one pair of criteria is consistent with these response probabilities. Given these criteria values,
the monotonic (one-to-one) relationship between perceptual sensitivity and response probability (Figure
5B) demonstrates that a specific value of the response probability is consistent with one, and only one,
value of sensitivity at a location. The analytical proof presented above simply formalized this graphical
demonstration.
Note that the complementary probabilities, viz., response probabilities at location a when a stimulus
was presented at the opposite location, corresponding to the following pair of equations:
p12 =
∫ ∞
c1
F2(e1 − d2 − c1 + c2) f1(e1) de1 (11)
p21 =
∫ ∞
c2
F1(e2 − d1 − c2 + c1) f2(e2) de2 (12)
have not been used to demonstrate parameter uniqueness. Conditioned on the 2-ADC model with four
parameters (d1, d2, c1, c2), these two probabilities are not free to vary (system (3) is overdeterminate). If
the solution {di, ci} does not satisfy these equations, we must consider the possibility that no solution
to system (3) exists. In this case, more elaborate models may be necessary to fit the data, and these
are discussed below. What we have shown in this section is that if a solution set, {di, ci}, of parameters
exists, then it is unique under this model.
II. Uniqueness of m-ADC sensitivities and criteria
In the previous section, we showed that criteria and sensitivities are uniquely determined by response
probabilities in the 2-ADC model. In this section we extend this result to demonstrate that response
probabilities in the m-ADC model uniquely determine the 2m parameters, corresponding to the criterion
and sensitivity at each of the m locations, for any m ≥ 2.
The demonstration proceeds in two steps. First we demonstrate the following with mathematical
induction: if the m-ADC model for a task with m response alternatives has a unique solution set of
criteria, then so does the model for a task with (m + 1) alternatives. Next, we utilize monotonicity to
show that perceptual sensitivities are also uniquely determined for the m-ADC task.
II-A. Uniqueness of the m-ADC criteria We consider the probability of responses when during
catch trials. This is given by:
p(Y = i| ‖X‖1 = 0) =
∫ ∞
ci
∏
k,k 6=i
Fk(ei − ci + ck) fi(ei) dei
i ∈ {0, . . . ,m} (13)
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Figure 5. Uniqueness of 2-ADC model parameters. (A) Variation of the probability of response
at location 1 with the criterion at each location (for constant sensitivities, Table S2A). The probability
of response to location 1, for a stimulus presented at location 1, decreases monotonically with an
increasing choice criterion (c1) at location 1 (solid red line) and increases monotonically with an
increasing choice criterion (c2) at location 2 (dashed red line). The same monotonic trends are observed
when a stimulus is presented at location 2 (blue curves). (B) Variation of the probability of response at
location 1 with the sensitivity at each location (for constant criteria, Table S2A). The probability of
response to location 1 increases monotonically with increasing sensitivity (d1) to a stimulus at location
1 (red), and decreases monotonically with increasing sensitivity (d2) to a stimulus at location 2 (blue).
(C) Probability of response (during catch trials) to a stimulus at location 1 (left), location 2 (middle),
or NoGo (right) as function of the choice criterion at each location. Colored lines: The contour
traversing all possible pairs of criteria consistent with a specific value of each response probability; red:
probability of a Go response to location 1; blue: probability of a Go response to location 2; green:
probability of a NoGo response. (D) The three contours (red, blue, green) intersect at a single point
indicating that exactly one set of criteria is consistent with a given set of response probabilities.
Arrows: Specific values of NoGo and Go response probabilities at each location and the unique pair of
criteria that is consistent with this specific set of response probabilities.
Statement Given a set of response probabilities Pi0 for an m-alternative task, if the system
of equations (13) has a solution given by the ordered set of criteria C = {ci : i ∈ {0, . . . ,m}},
then this solution is unique.
Basis The set of parameters C = {c1, c2}, forms a unique solution of the system (13) for a
2-alternative task (m=2).
Inductive step Given a set of response probabilities pi0 = Qi for an m-alternative task,
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let the set of criteria Cm = {ci : i ∈ {0, . . . ,m}} be a unique solution of the system (13).
Then, for a given set of response probabilities pi0 = Pi0 for an m+1-alternative task, a set of
criteria Cm+1 = {cj : j ∈ {0, . . . ,m+ 1}} that satisfies system equations (13) is also a unique
solution.
Proof of basis In a previous section we proved that the criteria are uniquely determined by the
2-ADC response probabilities during catch trials (see Section 3.3-I). This constitutes the proof of the
basis for m = 2.
Proof of inductive step The inductive step is proved, as before, in two stages:
The proof rests on the following lemmas, which are proved in Appendices A.4-A.6 (Supporting Infor-
mation).
Lemma 4 Given a set of response probabilities pr0 = Pr0 , r ∈ {0, . . . ,m + 1}, and any
solution set C = {cj : j ∈ {0, . . . ,m+ 1}} comprising ordered sets of choice criteria satisfying
the system (13). There is a one-to-one mapping between any choice criterion ci and its
complement set C ′i = {cj : j ∈ {0, . . . ,m+ 1}, j 6= i}.
Lemma 5 Given a set of response probabilities Pi0, i ∈ 1, . . . ,m+ 1 and the set of all solution
sets {Ck = {cjk : j ∈ 0, . . . ,m+ 1}} comprising ordered sets of choice criteria satisfying the
system (13). For any two solution sets C1 and C2 every pair of corresponding elements
(cj
1, cj
2) obeys the same order relation i.e. if any ci1 ≷ ci2 then every cj1 ≷ cj2, i, j ∈
{0, . . . ,m+ 1}, i 6= j.
Lemma 6 Given a set of response probabilities P00 and the set of all solution sets {Ck = {cjk :
j ∈ 0, . . . ,m+ 1}} comprising ordered sets of choice criteria satisfying the system (13). For
any two solution sets C1 and C2 at least one pair of corresponding elements (cj1, cj2) differs
in its order relation i.e. if any ci1 ≷ ci2 then at least one cj1 ≶ cj2, i, j ∈ {0, . . . ,m+1}, i 6= j.
Simply put, Lemma 4 states that given set of false alarm and correct rejection rates, fixing one
choice criterion determines all of the other choice criteria. The proof of Lemma 4 utilizes the induction
hypothesis (see Appendix A.4). Lemma 5 states that if the choice criterion to one location were to
increase (decrease), the choice criterion at every location has to also increase (decrease) to maintain the
false alarm rate unchanged at each location. Lemma 6 states that if the choice criterion to one location
were to increase (decrease), the choice criterion at least at one location has to decrease (increase) to
maintain the correct rejection rate unchanged.
The sequence of arguments for the proof proceeds as follows:
(i) Let C = {cj : j ∈ {0, . . . ,m+ 1}} correspond to a solution of the system (13) for a specific value of
pi0 = Pi0. Let C ′ = {c′j : j ∈ {0, . . . ,m+ 1}} be a different, unique solution for the same Pi0.
(ii) By Lemma 4, cj 6= c′j ∀ j. Without loss of generality, let ci > c′i.
(iii) By Lemma 5, if ci > c′i, then cj > c′j ∀ j, j 6= i.
(iv) By Lemma 6, if ci > c′i, then at least one cj < c′j for some j 6= i.
The proof follows by contradiction. Thus, there is a unique set of criteria C = {cj : j ∈ {0, . . . ,m+1}},
which satisfies (13) for p(Y = i|X0 = 1) = Pi0. In other words, specifying the response probabilities during
catch trials (false alarm rates) at each of the m locations uniquely determines the choice criteria.
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II-B. Uniqueness of the m-ADC sensitivities The proof rests on the following lemma (proved in
Appendix A.7, Supporting Information):
Lemma 7 The response probability pij(dk) is a strictly monotonic function of each dk.
The sequence of arguments proceeds as follows:
(i) By the task specification, no more than one stimulus is presented on a given trial. Thus, for a
fixed set of criteria C, the response probabilities pii of (6) are simply a function of their respective
perceptual sensitivities di.
(ii) From Lemma 7, the response probability pii(di) is a strictly monotonic function of its respective
di, i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}.
(iii) Strict monotonicity implies invertibility and demonstrates a one-to-one mapping between the pii-s
and the di-s.
(iv) Hence, there is a unique solution di determined by each of the m probabilities pii, j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}.
This completes the proof. Note that the same arguments could be made with other sets of probabilities,
such as the false-alarm rates, pji , for reporting a stimulus at location j when a stimulus was presented at
location i, which are also monotonic functions of di (Appendix A.7).
Optimality of m-ADC decision surfaces
We have demonstrated that the m-ADC model equations are solvable, and that the solution is unique.
But does the model have the potential to explain real-world behaviors that typically involve strategies
aimed at maximizing benefit (or reward) or minimizing cost (or punishment)?
Here, we show that for the m-ADC formulation (4), the m-ADC decision boundaries (5) belong to a
family of optimal decision surfaces for maximizing average utility or minimizing average risk; the utility
(or risk) is defined as the benefit (or cost) associated with choosing a particular response when a particular
stimulus occurs, and is assumed to be uniquely specified for each stimulus-response contingency. When
the cost of making an erroneous response is the same for all stimulus contingencies, optimal decision
surfaces for maximizing average utility (or minimizing average risk) for additive signals and noise are the
isosurfaces of the generalized likelihood (or constant log-likelihood) ratio [17].
For the m-ADC task, the decision variable (signal and noise) distributions (4) can be rewritten in
terms of a multivariate (m-dimensional) Gaussian random variable with a diagonal covariance matrix.
The equation of such a multivariate Gaussian variable W, with mean W0 = [w01w02 . . . w0m] and a diagonal
covariance matrix C (Ckk = σk,Ckl = 0, k, l ∈ {1, ...,m}, k 6= l) is:
N(W; W0,C) = Ae
−
m∑
k=1
(wk−w0k)
2
2σ2
k (14)
where A = 1/
∏m
k=1
√
2piσk is a normalization constant in order for N to be a probability density.
The m-ADC model assumes that the noise distribution has zero mean (W0 = 0). Thus, when no
stimulus is presented (|X|1 = 0 or Xi = 0∀i), the noise distribution is given by:
N(W|Xi = 0 ∀i) = Ae
−
m∑
k=1
w2k
2σ2
k (15)
A stimulus at location j displaces the noise distribution along its perceptual dimension by qj . Thus,
the signal distribution in this case is given by:
N(W|Xj = 1, Xi = 0 ∀i 6= j) = Ae
− (wj−qj)
2
2σ2
j
−
m∑
k=1,k 6=j
w2k
2σ2
k (16)
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For the decision between the stimulus at location j versus no stimulus, the log-likelihood ratio is given
by:
Lj0(W) = log N(W|Xj = 1, Xi = 0 ∀i 6= j)
N(W|Xi = 0 ∀i) (17)
=
−(wj − qj)2
2σ2j
+
w2j
2σ2j
(18)
which after some rearrangement reduces to:
Lj0(W) =
2wjqj − q2j
2σ2j
(19)
We define normalized quantities, Ψj = wj/σj and dj = qj/σj , measured in units of noise standard
deviation along dimension j. Thus,
Lj0(W) = Ψjdj − d2j/2 (20)
The generalized likelihood ratio is obtained by multiplying the ratio of the prior probabilities of
stimulus j and no stimulus (pj/p0 = p(Xj = 1, Xi = 0 ∀i 6= j)/p(Xi = 0 ∀i)) with the likelihood ratio.
Thus, the generalized log-likelihood ratio is obtained by adding log(pj/p0) to the likelihood ratio.
Λj0(W) = Lj0(W) + log pj
p0
(21)
= Ψjdj − d2j/2 + log
pj
p0
(22)
Thus, optimal decision surfaces for distinguishing a stimulus at location j from no stimulus (isosurfaces
of constant Λj0) are hyperplanes of constant Ψj . Thus, the specification of a cutoff criterion at Ψj = cj
corresponds to the subject making a decision by selecting one from among the family of optimal decision
surfaces. The precise choice of cj would depend on the cost/utility of choosing each alternative, the prior
probability ratio (pj/p0) as well as the sensitivity along that dimension (dj).
Let us now consider the decision between a stimulus at location i versus a stimulus at location j. For
this case, the log-likelihood ratio is given by:
Lij(W) = log N(W|Xi = 1, Xk = 0 ∀k 6= i)
N(W|Xj = 1, Xk = 0 ∀k 6= j) (23)
=
−(wi − qi)2
2σ2i
+
w2i
2σ2i
+
(wj − qj)2
2σ2j
− w
2
j
2σ2j
(24)
which after some rearrangement reduces to:
Lij(W) = (2wiqi − q
2
i )
2σ2i
− (2wjqj − q
2
j )
2σ2j
(25)
As before, introducing normalized quantities Ψi = wi/σi, di = qi/σi,Ψj = wj/σj , dj = qj/σj , mea-
sured in units of noise standard deviation along the respective dimensions (i or j):
Lij(W) = Ψidi − d2i /2−Ψjdj + d2j/2 (26)
And the generalized log-likelihood ratio is, as before:
Λij(W) = Ψidi − d
2
i
2
−Ψjdj +
d2j
2
+ log
pi
pj
(27)
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Optimal decision surfaces for distinguishing a stimulus at location i from a stimulus at location j
(isosurfaces of constant Λij) are hyperplanes obeying the following relation: Ψidi − Ψjdj = C, where
C is a constant that incorporates the benefit (or cost) associated with correctly identifying stimulus
contingencies i and j. Specifically, when di = dj = d (Figure 7B, left), these decision surfaces are planes
of constant Ψi −Ψj (=C/d).
Note that in the m-ADC model the decision is based on the relative magnitudes of Ψi − ci R Ψj − cj
(5); this can be rearranged as Ψi − Ψj R ci − cj or Ψi − Ψj R bij where bij = ci − cj is the bias for
location j relative to locations i, quantified as the difference of the criteria between the two locations.
Thus, when di = dj the decision surfaces in the m-ADC model (constant Ψi −Ψj) belong to the family
of optimal decision surfaces for discriminating between a stimulus at location i versus at location j.
Thus, the optimal decision surfaces for additive Gaussian signal and noise distributions are hyperplanes
in m-dimensional perceptual space, a key feature of the m-ADC model (Figure 2C). The proof for why
these surfaces should intersect at a point is beyond the scope of this article (but see [17]). However, it
is clear that if these don’t intersect at point, then the perceptual space could contain domains where the
optimal decision is not uniquely specified.
We summarize below the generalized log-likelihood ratios, as well as the equations for each optimal
decision boundary:
Λj0(W) = log
pj
p0
+ Ψjdj − d2j/2 Ψj = cj
Λij(W) = log
pi
pj
+ Ψidi − d
2
i
2
−Ψjdj +
d2j
2
Ψi −Ψj = ci − cj
(28)
(29)
These results demonstrate that our choice of decision surfaces in the m-ADC model is optimal (for
maximizing average utility or minimizing risk), when the sensitivities (di) across locations are identical.
Figure 2C illustrates these optimal decision surfaces for the 2-ADC case (thick black lines).
Psychometric functions in the m-ADC model
The m-ADC model developed so far provides a means to estimate perceptual sensitivity while controlling
for choice bias when the stimulus was either presented at a fixed strength at one of the m locations
or absent. However, perceptual sensitivity (d) is, in fact, a function of stimulus strength: stronger,
more salient stimuli are more reliably detected because the signal distribution for such stimuli is further
removed (translated) from the noise distribution (higher d), resulting in decreased overlap between the
signal and noise distributions (Figure 2A). The psychometric function describes the variation of perceptual
sensitivity d with stimulus strength.
It is often of interest to understand how an experimental manipulation, such as cueing a particular
location for attention, affects the underlying psychometric function: does the manipulation scale, shift or
change the slope of the psychometric function? Such an analysis is fundamental to evaluating competing
hypotheses (normalization, response gain, contrast gain) regarding the nature of attention’s effects on
perception [18–20].
In this section, we extend the m-ADC model to estimate the psychometric function of detection
sensitivity. We demonstrate that the various effects on the psychometric function (scaling, shift, slope
change) can be directly inferred from the response probabilities with a one-shot estimation procedure. We
demonstrate that models that do not account for bias (differences in c) across locations, produce spurious
differences in psychometric function estimates. Finally, we demonstrate that ignoring catch trials in the
analysis, and treating the behavioral data as if they were acquired in a forced choice design, also results
in systematically biased psychometric function estimates.
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Relating response probabilities to the psychometric function
In order to account for the variation of perceptual sensitivity (d) with stimulus strength, we introduce
the following modification to the structural model:
Ψi = di(ξi) + εi (30)
where ξi, i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} represents some metric of stimulus strength at location i, and the psychometric
function di(ξi) describes the functional dependence of sensitivity at location i on the stimulus strength
at that location. For ease of description, we choose ξi to represent the contrast of the stimulus. In
this exemplar case our theory relates response probabilities to the well-known psychometric function of
stimulus contrast.
In addition, we assume that the subject employs a fixed criterion, ci, at each location that is indepen-
dent of (does not vary with) stimulus strength. Such an assumption is plausible for task designs in which
stimulus strength is varied pseudorandomly across trials, so that the subject is unaware of the strength of
an upcoming stimulus and, hence, cannot adjust her/his criterion systematically with stimulus strength.
Thus, the decision rule remains the same as the m-ADC decision rule (5).
Based on equations (6) and (30), response probabilities for each stimulus contrast ξ may be derived
as:
p(Y = i| ξ) =
∫ ∞
ci−di(ξi)
∏
k,k 6=i
Fk(ei + di(ξi)− dk(ξk)− ci + ck) fi(ei) dei (31)
where ξ represents the contrast of the stimulus presented at each of the m-locations (ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξm). In
the m-ADC task design, the stimulus may be presented at no more than one location on a given trial so
that all but one of the ξi are zero.
In order to model the psychometric function, we look for a parametric function such that the parame-
ters of this function independently control the scale, shift or slope of the function. A variety of parametric
functions, such as the hyperbolic-ratio function, logistic function or Weibull function have been used in
previous studies. For illustration, we choose the commonly used hyperbolic-ratio (or Naka-Rushton)
function; the results that follow hold regardless of the specific choice of function.
The hyperbolic-ratio function, defined as:
d(ξ) = dmax
(
ξn
ξn + ξ50
n
)
(32)
provides an analytical relationship between sensitivity d, and stimulus contrast, ξ. The parameters of
this function, dmax, ξ50 and n (which we call psychometric parameters) correspond to the asymptotic
value, contrast at 50% of asymptotic value, and slope of the psychometric function, respectively. Altering
each parameter in turn scales (dmax), shifts (ξ50) or changes the slope (n) of the psychometric function.
Note that, by definition, altering the criteria should have no impact on the psychometric function.
Estimating psychometric parameters from response probabilities
As before, we demonstrate parameter recovery with the 2-ADC model. The demonstration is readily
extended to the m-ADC case.
For the 2-ADC model, the response probabilities may be written, by simplifying (31) as:
p(Y = i| ξi, ξj) =
∫ ∞
ci−di(ξi)
Fj(ei + di(ξi)− dj(ξj)− (ci − cj)) fi(ei)dei (33)
i, j ∈ {1, 2}
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The psychometric function of contrast at each location (di(ξi)) is defined by a set of parameters specific
to that location (dmax, ξ50, n)i (Table S3). Figure S1 depicts the effect of varying each psychometric
parameter and choice criterion on the response probabilities, for stimuli of various contrasts at location
1, p(Y = i|ξ1) (parameter values in Table S3A).
For values of the parameters that do not saturate the response probabilities, the effect of varying the
psychometric parameters dmax, ξ50 and n on the response probability curves (Figure S1A-C) is similar
to the effect of the respective parameter on the psychometric function, d(ξ), viz. scaling, shift and
slope change (Figure S1A-C, insets). On the other hand, altering each response criterion (ci) alters the
response probability curves in complex ways: the effects include apparent scaling, shift and/or slope
changes (Figure S1 D-E). However, the response probability at a location increases across all ξ with
decreasing criterion at that location, and with increasing criterion at the opposite location, consistent
with the monotonic trends noted before (Figure 5A).
Psychometric parameters (dmax, ξ50, n)i and biases ci at each location could be reliably recovered
from simulated response probabilities with a one-shot ML estimation procedure. As before, response
probabilities were computed by simulating equation (33) based on a prespecified set of bias and sensitivity
parameters (Table S3A) at six equally-spaced values of contrast (ξk ∈ [0, 100]), with 50% catch trials and
25% stimulus trials at each of the two locations; this process was repeated for 100 simulated runs (1000
trials per contrast value for each simulation). As before, we denote these by Prs (ξk) (Figure 7-B circles,
errorbars denote standard deviations across simulated runs), corresponding to the probability of response
at location r when a stimulus is presented at location s with contrast ξk (k = 1-6). These simulated
response proportions were provided as input to a maximum likelihood estimation algorithm in lieu of
experimental data.
Psychometric parameters and biases were reliably recovered with the ML estimation procedure (Table
S3B). Response probability curves, as well the psychometric functions, computed from the recovered
parameters fit the data with virtually no error (Figure 6A-B, solid curves, Figure 6C solid black curve).
Effects of ignoring choice bias or catch trial/NoGo performance
In the previous simulations, we employed identical psychometric parameters at the two locations resulting
in identical psychometric function estimates. However, the choice criteria at the two locations were
specified to be different, with a higher criterion at location 2 (c1 = 0.1, c2 = 0.7), implying a choice bias
toward location 1. What are the consequences of ignoring this bias (differences in ci-s across locations)
for estimating the psychometric function?
We estimated values of the psychometric function based on a model that ignores bias by assuming
uniform ci = c, i ∈ {1, 2} across the two locations. The resultant psychometric parameter estimates
and psychometric function are shown in Table S3B and Figure 6C (dashed curves) respectively. Even
though the reconstructed response probabilities (Figure 6A-B, dashed curves) closely matched the original
data (Figure 6A-B, circles), detection sensitivities di were systematically overestimated at location 1, the
location of greater bias (Figure 6C, dashed red curve), and systematically understimated at the other
location (Figure 6C, dashed blue curve).
In the m-ADC model, the perceptual sensitivity d, for detecting a stimulus at a location, is also
related to the discrimination accuracy (the accuracy with discriminating between two locations of stimulus
presentation, as in a 2-AFC task) by a scale factor of
√
2 (Figure 2C, distance between centers of red and
blue distributions, assuming d1 = d2 = d; see also Appendix in [15]). Thus, the 2-ADC psychometric
function of discrimination accuracy is also related to the psychometric function of detection accuracy
d(ξ) by a scale factor of
√
2.
We estimated discrimination accuracy across the two locations by treating the data as if they were
acquired with a two-alternative forced choice (2-AFC) task. For this analysis we ignored catch trials and
NoGo responses, considering observations from only the first two rows and columns of the contingency
table (Table S1B). In addition, for ease of demonstration, this analysis was performed with a model
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Figure 6. Psychometric functions in the 2-ADC model. (A) Probability of response at location
1 as a function of the contrast of a stimulus at location 1 (red circles) or location 2 (blue circles).
Error-bars: Standard deviation across simulated runs (N=100). Solid curves: Maximum likelihood
estimate (MLE) fits to response probabilities with a model that incorporated bias. Dashed curves:
MLE fits with a model that did not incorporate bias. (B) Same as in (A), but response probability at
location 2. (C) Maximum likelihood estimates of the psychometric function of detection sensitivity,
d(ξ), as a function of stimulus contrast. Black curve: Psychometric function estimated with a model
that incorporated bias. Red and blue dashed curves: Psychometric functions at locations 1 and 2,
respectively, estimated with a model that did not incorporate bias. (D) Discrimination accuracy as a
function of stimulus contrast estimated by excluding catch trial/NoGo performance. Black curve:
2-ADC psychometric function of discrimination accuracy (
√
2d(ξ)) estimated incorporating catch trials
and NoGo responses. Symbols: 2-AFC psychometric functions of discrimination accuracy estimated
excluding catch trials and NoGo responses for three different cases: i) low criteria and high false-alarm
rates (c = −1.0, FA > 95%, black circles), ii) intermediate values of criteria and false-alarm rates
(c = 0.5, FA ∼30%, blue triangles), and iii) high criteria and low false-alarm rates (c = 2.0, FA < 5%,
red squares).
incorporating equal criteria across the two locations ci = c, i ∈ {1, 2}, although similar results hold if the
criteria are different.
For low values of the criteria (c = −1.0), corresponding to high false alarm rates during catch trials
(>95%), 2-AFC estimates of discrimination accuracy (Figure 6D, black circles) matched the true (2-ADC)
psychometric function of discrimination accuracy (Figure 6D, solid black curve, obtained by multiplying
black data in Figure 6C by
√
2). For intermediate values of c (c = 0.5, false alarm rates ∼30%), 2-AFC
estimates of discrimination accuracy were slightly greater (Figure 6D, blue triangles) than the true value
(black curve). For high values of c (c = 2.0) and very low false alarm rates during catch trials (<5%),
2-AFC estimates of discrimination accuracy substantially exceeded (Figure 6D, red squares) the true
value (black curve). Note that in each case, the 2-AFC accuracy estimates were derived from all relevant
observations in the data (excluding catch trials and NoGo responses) and, hence, fit these data perfectly.
Thus, despite appearing to fit the observed data accurately, models that do not account for choice bias
or those that ignore catch trial/NoGo performance produce highly erroneous, systematically inaccurate
estimates of perceptual sensitivity.
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Discussion
With the growing use of multialternative tasks for investigating the neural basis of perceptual and cog-
nitive phenomena, the need for developing new analytical models and theoretical frameworks for such
tasks is being increasingly recognized [21, 22]. In this study, we have developed a theoretical model that
decouples the effects of choice bias from those of perceptual sensitivity in multialternative detection tasks.
We demonstrate a unique and optimal mapping between model parameters and response probabilities,
and provided numerical methods for estimating model parameters rapidly and reliably. Thus, our model
provides a powerful tool for analyzing behavioral performance in widely used multialternative tasks of
perception, attention and decision-making.
Simulating the m-ADC model revealed several important caveats when analyzing and interpreting
multialternative behavioral data. When analyzed with a model that did not incorporate choice bias, de-
spite close fits to simulated behavioral data (Figure 6A-B dashed lines vs. circles), maximum-likelihood
estimation produced large and systematic differences in psychometric functions of sensitivity across loca-
tions whereas the actual underlying psychometric functions at the two locations were, in fact, identical
(Figure 6C, dashed red and blue vs. solid black curve). These spurious differences arose because a greater
proportion of responses arising from an increased choice bias to a location were erroneously attributed to
increased perceptual sensitivity at that location. Furthermore, estimating the psychometric function after
excluding catch trials and NoGo responses resulted in systematically inflated estimates of discrimination
accuracy, particularly when false-alarm rates were low. This result has important implications for mul-
tialternative behavioral designs that report low false alarm rates during catch trials as evidence against
a guessing strategy, and ignore data from these catch trials in the subsequent analysis of behavioral
responses.
In any behavioral model, demonstrating the uniqueness of underlying model parameters is necessary
to meaningfully interpret the behavioral significance of absolute (or relative) parameter values [23]. The
m-ADC model is among the most parsimonious class of analytical models for multialternative detection
as a result of several key assumptions (discussed next); this parsimony permitted us to analytically
demonstrate the uniqueness of the sensitivity and bias parameters for multialternative tasks with any
number of alternatives (models of arbitrarily high dimensions). Such an analytical demonstration is
considerably more challenging, and often never accomplished, for more complex models.
Assumptions and extensions of the m-ADC model
The m-ADC latent variable formulation makes several assumptions: (i) underlying perceptual dimensions
(decision variable axes) are orthogonal; (ii) distributions of the decision variables are independent (co-
variance matrix of Ψ is diagonal); (iii) variance of the decision variable distribution does not change with
stimulus contingency; and (iv) decision boundaries are linear (or planar). In the following, we discuss
which of these assumptions are reasonably justified, and which can be addressed by extending the model.
The assumption of independent decision variable distributions that are represented along orthogonal
dimensions (independent channels) has been tested in the two-dimensional case, and found valid for
stimulus attributes that are widely different perceptually (for instance, stimuli that are widely separated
in space or frequency) [24]. However, it is possible that the Ψi-s are not independent, and perceptual
sensitivities do not vary along orthogonal dimensions: signal covariation may arise from facilitative or
competitive interactions that operate across locations. In addition, decision variable distributions at
different locations could be correlated or, equivalently, decision variable axes could be separated by
angles different from 90◦. In this case the covariance matrix of Ψ is no longer diagonal; the model could
be extended to incorporate this scenario.
Equal variance for the decision variable distributions under signal and noise is a basic assumption
of conventional signal detection models; such an assumption permits defining a one-to-one relationship
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between the likelihood ratio and the decision variable axis. This assumption can be tested in the m-
ADC model. As the m-ADC model has a surplus of independent observations relative to parameters
(m2 − m), unequal variances of the signal distribution at each location may be incorporated into the
model by introducing the signal-to-noise variance ratio at each location as independent parameters,
although specifying an optimal decision rule is more complex with such models.
We have demonstrated that, for additive Gaussian signal and noise distributions, planar hypersurfaces
(hyperplanes), as defined by the choice criteria in the model, constitute a family of optimal decision
surfaces. A subset of decision surfaces in the current model (of the form Ψi −Ψj = ci − cj) are optimal
only if the values of sensitivity (d) are identical across locations (di = d ∀i, Figure 7B, left). In certain
experiments, such as when a particular spatial location is cued for attention, it is possible that d-s at the
two locations could be significantly different. The model may then be extended with a modified decision
rule to capture optimal decision making in this more general scenario of unequal d-s (Figure 7B, right).
Although not an assumption of the model, our task specification requires that no more than one
stimulus be presented on a given trial. A particular advantage of this task specification is that potential
second and higher interaction terms (of the form XiXj , XiXjXk, . . .) in the structural model vanish
automatically (as at least one Xi = 0). Tasks that violate this requirement and incorporate compound
stimulus contingencies (e.g. stimuli presented at more than one location, or more than one stimulus
feature presented, on a given trial) fall under the purview of the General Recognition Theory (GRT, [25])
framework (discussed next).
Relationship to previous signal detection models
A variety of two (and higher) dimensional signal detection (SDT) models have been proposed in literature
[3]: these are generally referred to as multichannel SDT models. However, the analysis of multialternative
detection tasks poses unique challenges, because such tasks fall under the category of partial identification
designs (see below); accounting for bias in SDT models for multialternative detection tasks remains an
important, open problem [14] (pp. 258, Figure 10.4).
The m-ADC model accounts for bias by incorporating an asymmetric decision rule (unequal criteria)
building upon a recently developed latent variable formalism for dealing with bias in multialternative
forced-choice (m-AFC) tasks [15]. How are the m-ADC and m-AFC models related?
The SDT model for a 2-AFC (binary choice) task involves a decision based on distinguishing between
two decision variable distributions. In a forced choice (2-AFC) task, these are the two signal distributions,
one for each hypothesis (e.g. stimulus at location 1 vs. 2, Figure 7A), whereas in a simple detection
(Yes/No) task, these are the signal (stimulus present) and noise (stimulus absent) distributions. On the
other hand, a two-alternative detection (2-ADC) task involves discriminating among three distributions:
two signal distributions, one representing each stimulus hypothesis, and a noise distribution (catch trials,
Figure 7B). For the 2-AFC task, the criterion represents a decision surface to distinguish between the
two signal distributions (Figure 7A), whereas in the 2-ADC task, the two criteria represent decision
boundaries between the noise distribution and each of the signal distributions (Figure 7B).
Based on this description, it is apparent that the m-ADC model reduces to the m-AFC model if
catch trials and NoGo responses are excluded (see also formal derivation in Appendix B, Supporting
Information). Thus, behavioral data that can be fit well with the m-AFC model can also be fit with the
m-ADC model. In general, the m-ADC design (with catch trials) also has the advantage of having more
independent observations than parameters (m2 −m) relative to the m-AFC design (m2 − 3m+ 1). The
additional independent observations permit more complex models, with more parameters to be specified,
and also permits rigorous internal tests of validity relative to the m-AFC model. Moreover, unlike the
m-AFC task design the m-ADC task design permits measuring true detection sensitivities for each of the
m-alternatives and overcomes potential confounds associated with a guessing strategy.
Our m-ADC model follows a rich literature on multidimensional signal detection models within the
framework of general recognition theory (GRT) [25]. In the psychoacoustic and vision literature, GRT
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Figure 7. Multidimensional signal detection models for analyzing multialternative task
designs. (A) Model schematic for a multialternative forced choice (here, 2-AFC) design [15]. (All
panels) Circles: decision variable distributions for each stimulus contingency. Red: contingency S1 (e.g.,
stimulus at location 1); blue: contingency S2 (e.g, stimulus at location 2). Thick black line: Optimal
decision surface. (B) Model schematic for a multialternative detection (here, 2-ADC) design. In
addition to stimulus contingencies S1 and S2 a third no-stimulus contingency, N (black circle) occurs
during “catch” trials. Left and right panels: Decision variable distributions and optimal decision
surfaces for equal (left) or unequal (right) sensitivities across contingencies. (C) Model schematic for a
complete identification design, based on general recognition theory (GRT) [25]. In addition to
contingencies S1, S2 and N a fourth compound stimulus contingency, S1S2 (dashed gray circle) occurs
in trials where both stimuli (or stimulus features) are presented. In the spatial detection task (such as
in Figure 1), this would correspond to the presentation of a stimulus (or change) at more than one
location on a given trial.
models have been widely applied in tasks involving the detection of multiple signals in noise [25,26]. These
models are relevant for tasks that implement a feature complete identification design ( [14] pp.260), such
as those shown in Figure 7C. This task involves discriminating four potential stimulus contingencies
(Figure 7C): noise alone (N), each stimulus alone (S1 or S2), or the compound stimulus (S1S2). Such a
four-way (2×2) discrimination simplifies the optimal decision rule (orthogonal pairs of lines) for Gaussian
signals and noise (Figure 7C, thick black lines) [26]. In the m-ADC tasks the stimulus (or change) occurs
at no more than one location on a given trial. Thus, the last contingency (compound, S1S2) of a GRT
design is never presented. Thus, the GRT model and decision rule do not apply to the m-ADC task.
A variety of models for dealing with bias in multialternative tasks have been formulated within the
framework of Luce’s choice theory [16]; standard methods in textbooks of behavioral analysis account
for bias with a choice theory model ( [14] pp.250). In contrast, few attempts have been made to deal
with bias in multialternative tasks from a signal detection framework [15]. Early attempts at two-
dimensional “detection and recognition” or (“detection and identification”) models began with [24, 27];
although conceptually similar to the m-ADC model, these models were geometrically formulated. Later
studies attempted to develop a mathematical formalism for these models by treating the decision variable
as a random vector akin to the multivariate decision variable in the m-ADC model [28]; these models
were formulated for double-judgment (detection and identification) tasks. The importance of accounting
for bias to avoid spurious conclusions in multidimensional models for such double judgment tasks has
been clearly highlighted [29]. However, these earlier formulations were based on complete identification
designs, those that incorporate the compound stimulus contingency (S1S2, Figure 7C) [28,30].
On the other hand, psychophysical tasks of detection and attention, such as those presented in this
study (Figure 1) and elsewhere [9, 10], are all partial (or incomplete) identification designs in which no
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more than one stimulus or change is presented on a given trial (Figure 7B). Hence, although the mathe-
matical formalism in previous SDT models resembles the m-ADC model, the decision rule is significantly
different (Figure 7B vs. 7C). The specification of the m-ADC decision rule is, arguably, more complex
and, consequently, the analytical formulation of bias in multialternative detection tasks is a fundamentally
novel aspect of the m-ADC model.
Conclusion
An animal’s behavior results from an amalgamation of various factors: perceptual, motivational, deci-
sional, and the like. Inferring the complex relationship between an animal’s perception and its behavior
is currently best accomplished by recourse to theoretical frameworks [31]. Frameworks, such as signal
detection theory, capture the effect of perceptual (sensitivity) vs. decisional (bias) factors at the level of
the organism as a behavioral unit. The m-ADC model developed in this study provides a rigorous and
testable framework of how sensitivity and bias affect the animal’s behavior in multialternative detection
tasks. Future work will involve extending this model to incorporate the influences of executive and cog-
nitive processes (such as attention) to sensitivity and bias as well as validating and refining the model
with behavioral data.
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Methods
Linking sensitivities and criteria to 2-ADC response probabilities
In the 2-ADC model, the probability of response at each location (Y = i) for each possible stimulus
condition (Xi) can be derived from the structural model (1) and decision rule (2). We illustrate the case
for p(Y = 1|X). The other cases may be similarly derived.
The probability of response at location 1 is the combined probability that the decision variable at
location 1 exceeds the choice criterion at that location, and that its magnitude (over its choice criterion)
is the larger of the two locations.
p(Y = 1|X1, X2) = p(Ψ1 > c1 ∩Ψ1 − c1 > Ψ2 − c2) (34)
which, upon substitution of the structural model gives:
p(Y = 1|X1, X2) = p(ε1 > c1 − d1X1 ∩
ε1 + d1X1 − c1 > ε2 + d2X2 − c2)
(35)
We condition the above probability on a given value of ε1 = e1.
p(Y = 1|X1, X2, ε1 = e1) (36)
= p(e1 > c1 − d1X1 ∩ e1 + d1X1 − c1 > ε2 + d2X2 − c2)
= H(e1 − c1 + d1X1) p(ε2 < e1 + d1X1 − d2X2 − c1 + c2)
= H(e1 − c1 + d1X1) F2(e1 + d1X1 − d2X2 − (c1 − c2)) (37)
where H(x) is the Heaviside function and F2 represents the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of the noise distribution at location 2, ε2.
The conditional probability for a response at location 1 is found by integrating over the distribution
of e1.
p(Y = 1|X1, X2) =
∫ ∞
−∞
H(e1 − c1 + d1X1)
F2(e1 + d1X1 − d2X2 − (c1 − c2)) f1(e1) de1
(38)
where f1 represents the probability density function of the noise distribution at location 1, ε1.
The Heaviside function may be dropped from the integrand by defining the lower bound of the integral
at c1 − d1X1. In other words,
p(Y = 1|X1, X2) =
∫ ∞
c1−d1X1
F2(e1 + d1X1 − d2X2
− (c1 − c2))f1(e1) de1
(39)
Similarly, the conditional probability of a response at location 2 is given by:
p(Y = 2|X1, X2) =
∫ ∞
c2−d2X2
F1(e2 + d2X2 − d1X1
− (c2 − c1)) f2(e2) de2
(40)
These equations represent six independent observations corresponding to the Go response (Y = 1 or
Y = 2). Three other response probabilities, corresponding to the NoGo response (Y = 0) are not free
to vary as the Go and NoGo responses are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. These probabilities are
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readily calculated as: p(Y = 0|Xi) = 1 − p(Y = 1|Xi) − p(Y = 2|Xi), and can be shown to be equal to∏2
i=1 Fi(ci − diXi). Each of these nine probabilities corresponds to one of the nine contingencies in the
2-ADC contingency table (Table S1B).
The set of equations (39) and (40) represents an overdeterminate system, as there are six independent
observations, but only four parameters {di, ci} (i = 1, 2). Thus, there is redundancy in the response
probabilities (only four are free to vary, given the model parameters). These remaining probabilities can
then be used as an internal test of the validity of the model.
As equations (39) and (40) have similar forms, we will combine these into a single system of equations.
These, together with the equations describing the NoGo response probabilities, constitute the 2-ADC
model system (reproduced in the Results as equation system (3)).
p(Y = i|Xi, Xj) =
∫ ∞
ci−diXi
Fj(ei + diXi − djXj
− (ci − cj)) fi(ei) dei
(41)
p(Y = 0|Xi, Xj) = Fi(ci − diXi) Fj(cj − djXj)
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j
In simulations, we evaluated these probabilities with numerical integration. As the normal distribution
has infinite support, the integrands on the right hand sides of these equations should be integrated to
an upper limit at plus infinity, a numerically intractable bound. We used Gauss-Kronrod quadrature (as
implemented in the quadgk function in Matlab) in order to evaluate these integrals.
Linking sensitivities and criteria to m-ADC response probabilities
Based on the structural model (4) and decision rule (5) in the m-ADC model we derive the probabilities
of response at location i (Y = i) given a stimulus at location j (Xj = 1).
p(Y = i|X) = p((Ψi > ci) ∩ (Ψi − ci > Ψ1 − c1) ∩
(Ψi − ci > Ψ2 − c2) . . . ∩ (Ψi − ci > Ψm − cm))
(42)
where we have used the notation X, which represents a vector (X1, X2, . . . , Xm). For a stimulus presented
at the j-th location (Xj = 1) the j-th element of the vector is 1 and all other elements 0; when no stimulus
is presented (catch trial) all elements are zero (Xi = 0 ∀ i). Thus, ‖X‖1 = 1 (stimulus trial) or 0 (catch
trial); this follows from the task specification, that no more than one stimulus is presented on a given
trial.
Upon substitution of the structural model, this gives:
p(Y = i|X) = p((εi > ci − diXi) ∩k (43)
(εi + diXi − ci > εk + dkXk − ck) i 6= k
Similar to the 2-ADC case, we condition the above probability on a given value of εi = ei.
p(Y = i|X, ei) = p((ei > ci − diXi) ∩k,k 6=i
(ei + diXi − ci > εk + dkXk − ck)
= H(ei − ci + diXi) ∩k,k 6=i
p(εk < ei + diXi − dkXk − ci + ck)
= H(ei − ci + diXi)∏
k,k 6=i
Fk(ei + diXi − dkXk − ci + ck)
(44)
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where H(x) is the Heaviside function and Fk represents the cumulative distribution function of the
decision variable distribution at location k,Ψk. In deriving this expression, we have used the fact that
the Ψk distributions are mutually independent, such that their joint probability density factors into a
product of the individual densities.
The probability of a response at location i is then found by integrating over the probability density
of ei.
p(Y = i|X) =
∫ ∞
−∞
H(ei − ci + diXi)∏
k,k 6=i
Fk(ei + diXi − dkXk − ci + ck) fi(ei) dei
=
∫ ∞
ci−diXi
∏
k,k 6=i
Fk(ei + diXi
− dkXk − ci + ck) fi(ei) dei
(45)
This constitutes the m-ADC model system of equations relating response probabilities for each stim-
ulus contingency to the sensitivity and criterion at each location (reproduced in the results as equation
system (6).
Maximum likelihood and Markov-Chain Monte Carlo estimation of sensitivi-
ties and criteria in the m-ADC model
The maximum likelihood (line-search) or ML-LS algorithm was implemented by minimizing the negative
of the log-likelihood function with an unconstrained minimization algorithm (fminunc, in Matlab’s Op-
timization Toolbox). The optimization algorithm also returns a numerical approximation to the Hessian
matrix. Standard errors based on ML-LS estimation were derived as the square root of the diagonal
elements of the inverse of this Hessian matrix. Our algorithm for ML estimation differs from the pre-
viously published algorithm for the related m-AFC task, where each response variable was assumed to
follow an independent Bernoulli distribution [15]. The responses in our task were assumed to follow a
multinomial distribution. For both m-ADC and m-AFC tasks, conditional response probabilities are not
independent: the total number of responses for each stimulus contingency sums to the number of trials
for that contingency; thus, the conditional response probabilities for each stimulus contingency should
sum to one.
The Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm (MCMC, Metropolis sampling) was custom implemented
for estimating sensitivity and criteria from simulated response counts Ors (denoting the number of re-
sponses to location r for a stimulus at location s). In the following, Ns denotes the total number of trials
for each stimulus contingency s and the symbol di is used as a general notation either for sensitivity, di
when estimation was performed at a single value of stimulus strength, or for the collection of psychometric
parameters (dmax, n, ξ50)i when estimation was performed on the entire psychometric function.
(i) Generate an initial guess for the parameters (dri , cri ) (the superscript r denotes a reference set).
Designate this as the reference parameter set. Determine response probabilities from (3) based on
this set. We denote these probabilities by ϕrs(ξk| dri , cri ).
(ii) Compute the likelihood value Lr assuming that responses Ors follow a multinomial distribution with
parameters Ns, ϕrs
(iii) Generate a new guess for the parameters (dni , cni ), based on a transition probability distribution for
the parameters.
33
(iv) Determine response probabilities and the associated likelihood value Ln based on the new guess.
(v) Compute a likelihood ratio based on the older and newer guesses: LR = Ln/Lr
(vi) Accept the new guess for the parameters with a probability a, that depends on the magnitude of the
likelihood ratio, a = min(LR, 1). Once accepted, the new set of parameters become the reference
set, and the likelihood value based on the last set of accepted parameters is used as the reference
value (Lr).
(vii) Repeat steps (iii) - (vi) until convergence.
We used Metropolis sampling of parameter space based on a symmetric, multivariate transition prob-
ability distribution (Gaussian, with standard deviation, σ = 0.02 in each dimension). The MCMC
simulation proceeded until the algorithm converged on a specific set of parameters di, ci, i ∈ {1, 2} in
four-dimensional space. The algorithm was determined to have converged when the value of L and the χ2
error function changed by less than 2% over at least 100 consecutive iterations. The burn-in period was
generally achieved within about 500 iterations (e.g. Figure 4E-F). Posterior distributions were computed
based on parameter values between iterations 1000-2000. Standard errors for the parameters and 95%
credible intervals reported (Table S2C) were based on the standard deviation and the [2.5-97.5] percentile
of the posterior distributions.
In the numerical estimation, the parameters {di, ci} were permitted to take both positive and nega-
tive values (unconstrained optimization); no constraint was placed on their sign or magnitude. However,
negative values of sensitivity parameters (di) lack physical meaning. We repeated the estimation by
constraining sensitivity parameters to take only positive values (with the constrained optimization func-
tion fmincon in Matlab, or with a custom-implemented MCMC Metropolis-Hastings algorithm); this
analysis yielded sensitivity estimates that matched those obtained with the unconstrained optimization
approaches.
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Figure S1. Effect of varying psychometric parameters and criteria on 2-ADC response
probabilities (A) (Left) Response probabilities p(ξ) at location 1 as a function of stimulus contrast ξ
at location 1. The family of curves (light gray to black) correspond to increasing values of asymptotic
sensitivity dmax at location 1. (Right) Same as in left panel, but response probabilities at location 2 as
a function of stimulus contrast at location 1. (Inset) Perceptual sensitivity d as a function of stimulus
contrast ξ for increasing dmax (scale parameter). (B) Same as in (A), but response probabilities for
increasing values of half-max contrast ξ50 (shift parameter). (C) Same as in (A), but response
probabilities for increasing values of the exponent n (slope parameter). (D) Same as in (A), but
response probabilities for increasing values of the criterion at location 1, c1. (E) Same as in (A), but
response probabilities for increasing values of the criterion at location 2, c2.
Table S1. Stimulus-response contingency table for 2-AFC and 2-ADC tasks. 
A. 2x2 stimulus-response contingency table for a 2-AFC (Yes/No) task. 
                      Response 
 
Stimulus 
Go response @ 
 Loc 1 NoGo response 
Stimulus 
@  Loc 1 Hit (HR) Miss (MR) 
Catch 
(No stimulus) False-alarm (FA) 
Correct rejection 
(CR) 
 
 
B. 3x3 stimulus-response contingency table for a 2-ADC task. 
                  Response 
 
Stimulus 
Go response @  
Loc 1 
Go response @  
Loc 2 
NoGo response 
Stimulus 
@  Loc 1 
Hit (HR1) False-alarm/ 
Incorrect response 
Miss (MR1) 
Stimulus 
@  Loc 2 
False-alarm/ 
Incorrect response 
Hit (HR2) Miss (MR2) 
Catch 
(No stimulus) 
False-alarm (FA1) False-alarm (FA2) Correct rejection (CR) 
 
In 2-AFC (Yes/No) tasks there is only one false-alarm: a Go response during catch trials (FA). In addition to 
this, another type of false-alarm response can occur in 2-ADC tasks: a Go response at a location when a 
stimulus was presented at the opposite location (gray shaded cells).
Table S2. Simulated parameter recovery with MLE and MCMC. 
A. Parameters used in the simulation. 
Parameter Location 1 Location 2 
sensitivity d1 = 1.0 d2 = 1.0 
criterion c1 = -0.25 c2 = 0.75 
noise ε1 = N(0, 1) ε2 = N(0, 1) 
stimulus prior probability p1 = 0.25 p2 = 0.25 
 
B. Simulated contingency table of response counts (N = 4000 trials from 20 simulated runs). 
                  Response 
 
Stimulus 
Go response @ 
Loc 1 
Go response @ 
Loc 2 
NoGo response 
Stimulus 
@  Loc 1 
871 66 63 
Stimulus 
@  Loc 2 
422 414 164 
Catch 
(No stimulus) 
1122 263 615 
 
C.  Sensitivities and criteria recovered with maximum likelihood (MLE) and Bayesian (Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo) estimation procedures. 
Parameter MLE (mean ±  SE)  Bayesian (mean ± SE)  95% CI 
sensitivity 
d1 = 1.07 ± 0.06 
d2 = 0.99 ± 0.06 
d1 = 1.07 ± 0.08 
d2 = 0.98 ± 0.08 
d1: 0.98 − 1.16 
d2: 0.89 − 1.08 
criterion 
c1 = -0.27 ± 0.03 
c2 = 0.75 ± 0.04 
c1 = -0.27 ± 0.03 
c2 = 0.75 ± 0.05 
c1: -0.30 − -0.21 
c2: 0.67 − 0.81 
SE: standard error, CI: credible intervals
 Table S3. Maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of the psychometric function with and without 
accounting for bias. 
A. Parameters used in the simulation of a 2-ADC model with bias (c1≠c2). 
Parameter Location 1 Location 2 
sensitivity 
dmax = 2.5 
d1(ξ1)      n = 2.0 
ξ50 = 0.35 
dmax = 2.5 
    d2(ξ2)     n = 2.0 
ξ50 = 0.35 
criterion c1 = 0.1 c2 = 0.7 
noise ε1 = N(0, 1) ε2 = N(0, 1) 
stimulus prior probability p1 = 0.25 p2 = 0.25 
 
B. ML estimates of 2-ADC psychometric parameters with and without accounting for bias. 
Parameter MLE with bias  (mean ±  SE)  
MLE without bias  
(mean ±  SE)  
sensitivity 
dmax = 2.48 ± 0.03 
     d1(ξ1)       n = 2.01 ± 0.05 
ξ50 = 0.34 ± 0.006 
 
dmax = 2.49 ± 0.03 
     d2(ξ2)       n = 2.03 ± 0.04 
  ξ50 = 0.35 ± 0.005 
dmax = 3.03 ± 0.05 
     d1(ξ1)        n = 1.69 ± 0.04 
ξ50 = 0.33 ± 0.008 
 
dmax = 2.49 ± 0.03 
     d2(ξ2)        n = 2.95 ± 0.07 
ξ50 = 0.38 ± 0.004 
criterion 
c1 = 0.10 ± 0.002 
c2 = 0.71 ± 0.003 
c1 = 0.35 ± 0.002 
c2 = 0.35 ± 0.002 
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Supporting Information: Appendix
A Proof of lemmas on the dependence of response probabilities
on sensitivity and criteria
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1: Monotonic variation of the probability of a NoGo
response with choice criteria in 2-ADC catch trials
Assertion: p(Y = 0|X1 = 0, X2 = 0; c1, c2) or p00 is a monotonically increasing function of both c1 and
c2. Specifically, p00 = F1(c1) F2(c2).
Proof: The most straightforward proof for this lemma relies on the fact that NoGo responses in the
2-ADC task occur when each decision variable independently falls below the choice criterion at the re-
spective location, and therefore, may be considered the joint outcome of two independent binary (Yes/No)
decisions. Thus, the probability of a NoGo response when no target is presented at either location (cor-
rect rejection) p00 factors into the product of the probability of NoGo response when no target is present
(correct rejection) in each Yes/No decision. Thus,
p00 = p(Y = 0|X1 = 0, X2 = 0)|2−ADC
= p(Y = 0|X1 = 0)|Y es/No p(Y = 0|X2 = 0)|Y es/No
= F1(c1) F2(c2) (46)
For the analytical proof we proceed, as before. The condition for a NoGo response is that Ψ falls
below the criterion at both locations (Y = 0, iffΨ1 ≤ c1 ∩ Ψ2 ≤ c2). Thus,
p(Y = 0|X1 = 0, X2 = 0) = p(Ψ1 ≤ c1 ∩ Ψ2 ≤ c2) (47)
Upon substitution of the structural model, and noting that the noise distributions are assumed inde-
pendent, this gives:
p(Y = 0|X1 = 0, X2 = 0) = p(ε1 ≤ c1 ∩ ε2 ≤ c2)
= p(ε1 ≤ c1)p(ε2 ≤ c2)
= F1(c1) F2(c2) (48)
Thus, the probability of a correct rejection in the 2-ADC task factors into the product of the 1-ADC
correct-rejection probabilities.
p00 = F1(c1) F2(c2) (49)
As the Fi-s are positive, and monotonically increasing functions of their arguments, p00 is a monoton-
ically increasing function of c1 and c2.
Verification that
∑
i p
i
0 = 1
The task specifies that the probabilities of response to the three locations are mutually exclusive and
exhaustive. Below we perform a consistency check to ensure that these probabilities indeed sum to unity.
Without loss of generality, we demonstrate this for the no stimulus condition X1 = 0, X2 = 0. The cases
with a stimulus at either location may be identically derived by replacing the appropriate criterion by its
difference with the respective sensitivity parameter, in other words, replace ci with ci − di. Some of the
results derived below will be used for later demonstrations.
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We rewrite the equations of (7) by changing the variable to integration to e′i where e′i = ei − ci, i ∈
{1, 2}. This gives:
p10 =
∫ ∞
0
F2(e
′
1 + c2) f1(e
′
1 + c1) de
′
1 (50)
p20 =
∫ ∞
0
F1(e
′
2 + c1) f2(e
′
2 + c2) de
′
2 (51)
Note that the change of variables altered the limits of integration such that these are no longer
dependent on ci. Next we integrate equation (50) by parts.
p10 = [F2(e
′
1 + c2) F1(e
′
1 + c1)]
∞
0 −
∫ ∞
0
F1(e
′
1 + c1) f2(e
′
1 + c2) de
′
1 (52)
= 1− (F2(c2) F1(c1))−
∫ ∞
0
F1(e
′
1 + c1) f2(e
′
1 + c2) de
′
1 (53)
where we have used the following identities of probability densities and cumulative densities:
d(Fi(x+ k)) = fi(x+ k);
∫
fi(x+ k)dx = Fi(x+ k); lim
x→∞Fi(x) = 1 (54)
The third term on the right hand side of equation (53),
∫∞
0
F1(e
′
1 + c1)f2(e
′
1 + c2)de
′
1 is identical with
p20 of equation (51) (the e′i are interchangeable, as they are simply variables of integration). Thus, this
equation may be written as:
p10 = 1− (F2(c2) F1(c1))− p20 (55)
1− (p10 + p20) = (F2(c2) F1(c1)) (56)
The left hand side of the above equation is nothing but p00. Thus, we have verified that
∑
i p
i
0 = 1.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2: Monotonic variation of the probabilities of Go re-
sponses with choice criteria in 2-ADC catch trials
Assertion: p(Y = i|X1 = 0, X2 = 0; c1, c2) or pi0 is a monotonically decreasing function of ci and a
monotonically increasing function of cj.
Proof:
We reproduce equations (7) here:
p10 =
∫ ∞
c1
F2(e1 + c2 − c1) f1(e1) de1 (57)
p20 =
∫ ∞
c2
F1(e2 + c1 − c2) f2(e2) de2 (58)
With increasing c1, p10 has to decrease because:
(i) The integrand (F2(e1 + c2 − c1), specifically) decreases because F2 is a monotonic function of its
arguments (e1 + c2 − c1 decreases)
(ii) The domain of integration (c1 →∞) decreases as c1 increases (the integrand is never negative)
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With increasing c2, p10 has to increase because the integrand increases (F2(e1 + c2− c1), specifically), and
the domain of integration is unaffected by c2. The (converse) effects of c1 and c2 on p20 can be similarly
argued.
We substantiate this argument by quantifying the change in the response probabilities with choice
criteria. This analysis is provided for the 2-ADC case only.
We begin with equations (50) and (51).
p10 =
∫ ∞
0
F2(e+ c2) f1(e+ c1) de
p20 =
∫ ∞
0
F1(e+ c1) f2(e+ c2) de
In the above, we have removed subscripts and the ′ on the e′i-s, as these are simply dummy variables
of integration. Due to the symmetry of form, the proof of monotonicity for any one of p10 or p20 suffices.
The assertion is proved in two parts: (i) we quantify the partial derivative of p10 with respect to c1,
and show that it is negative (∂p10/∂c1 ≤ 0), and (ii) we quantify the partial derivative of p10 with respect
to c2, and show that it is positive (∂p10/∂c2 ≥ 0),
Part (i): Differentiating p10 with respect to c1, we get:
∂p10
∂c1
=
∂
∂c1
[∫ ∞
0
F2(e+ c2) f1(e+ c1) de
]
(59)
Applying the Leibniz integral rule:
∂p10
∂c1
=
∫ ∞
0
∂(F2(e+ c2) f1(e+ c1))
∂c1
de
=
∫ ∞
0
F2(e+ c2)
∂f1(e+ c1)
∂c1
de (60)
Integrating by parts the expression on the right hand side:
∂p10
∂c1
=
[
F2(e+ c2)
∂F1(e+ c1)
∂c1
]∞
0
−
∫ ∞
0
f2(e+ c2)
∂F1(e+ c1)
∂c1
de
= −F2(c2) ∂F1(c1)
∂c1
−
∫ ∞
0
f2(e+ c2)
∂F1(e+ c1)
∂c1
de
= −
(
F2(c2) f1(c1) +
∫ ∞
0
f2(e+ c2) f1(e+ c1) de
) (61)
where we have used the identities from (54).
We note that both terms inside the parentheses on the right hand side are positive. The first is a
product of a CDF and a PDF, the second is an integral over a function that is a product of two PDF-s,
and hence never negative. Now taking the negative sign into consideration, it is clear that ∂p10/∂c1 is
negative for all c1.
Part (ii): Similarly, differentiating p10 with respect to c2, we get:
∂p10
∂c2
=
∂
∂c2
[∫ ∞
0
F2(e+ c2) f1(e+ c1) de
]
(62)
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Again applying the Leibniz integral rule:
∂p10
∂c2
=
∫ ∞
0
∂(F2(e+ c2) f1(e+ c1))
∂c2
de
=
∫ ∞
0
∂F2(e+ c2)
∂c2
f1(e+ c1) de
=
∫ ∞
0
f2(e+ c2) f1(e+ c1) de (63)
The integrand on the right hand side is a product of two probability density functions, and is positive
for all values of e (strictly positive if f1 and f2 are supported over [0,∞]). Thus, ∂p10/∂c2 is positive for
all c2.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3: Monotonic variation of response probabilities with
perceptual sensitivities in 2-ADC stimulus trials
Assertion: p(Y = i|Xi, Xj ; di, dj) or pij is a monotonic function of di and dj(i, j ∈ {1, 2}).
Proof: We reproduce part of equation system (3) here for reference.
p(Y = i|Xi, Xj) =
∫ ∞
ci−diXi
Fj(e+ diXi − djXj − ci + cj) fi(e) de (64)
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j
where we have dropped the subscript from ei (a variable of integration).
With increasing di, p(Y = i|Xi = 1) or pii has to increase because:
(i) The integrand (Fj(e+ di − ci + cj), specifically) increases because Fj is a monotonic function of its
arguments (di increases)
(ii) The domain of integration (ci− di →∞) increases as di decreases (the integrand is never negative)
With increasing dj , p(Y = i|Xj = 1) or pij has to decrease because:
(i) The integrand (Fj(e− dj − ci + cj), specifically) increases because Fj is a monotonic function of its
arguments (-dj decreases)
(ii) The domain of integration is unaffected by dj .
We substantiate this argument by quantifying the change in the response probabilities with perceptual
sensitivity. This analysis is provided for the 2-ADC case only.
We rewrite the above equations with the following transformation e′ = e − ci + diXi; as before, the
idea is to eliminate the occurrence of criterion and sensitivity in the limits of integration. The system
may then be rewritten as:
p(Y = i|Xi, Xj) =
∫ ∞
0
Fj(e
′ + cj − djXj) fi(e′ + ci − diXi) de′ (65)
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j
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In the following, we replace the notation for variable e′ with e. Computing the partial derivative of system
(3) with respect to di:
∂p(Y = i|Xi, Xj)
∂di
=
∂
∂di
(∫ ∞
0
Fj(e+ cj − djXj) fi(e+ ci − diXi) de
)
=
∫ ∞
0
∂
∂di
(Fj(e+ cj − djXj) fi(e+ ci − diXi)) de
=
∫ ∞
0
Fj(e+ cj − djXj)
(
∂fi(e+ ci − diXi)
∂di
)
de
(66)
Integrating by parts, and noting that ∂∂di (dkXk) = δikXk, we have:
∂p(Y = i|Xi, Xj)
∂di
=
[
Fj(e+ cj − djXj)∂Fi(e+ ci − diXi)
∂di
]∞
0
−
∫ ∞
0
fj(e+ cj − djXj) ∂Fi(e+ ci − diXi)
∂di
de
= −Fj(cj − djXj) fi(ci − diXi)(−Xi)
−
∫ ∞
0
fj(e+ cj − djXj) fi(e+ ci − diXi)(−Xi) de
= Xi {Fj(cj − djXj) fi(ci − diXi)
+
∫ ∞
0
fj(e+ cj − djXj) fi(e+ ci − diXi) de}
(67)
The right hand side is clearly positive being the sum of two positive terms: the product of a CDF
and PDF, and the integral of the product of two PDF-s, respectively (Xi ≥ 0, Xi ∈ {0, 1}). Thus,
∂
∂di
p(Y = i|Xi, Xj) ≥ 0 ∀ di (68)
Specifically, ∂∂di p(Y = i|Xi = 0, Xj = 1) =
∂pij
∂di
= 0, which confirms the intuition that the response
probability at location i to a stimulus at the opposite location j does not depend on the sensitivity at
location i.
Similarly, computing the partial derivative of system (3) with respect to dj :
∂p(Y = i|Xi, Xj)
∂dj
=
∫ ∞
0
(
∂Fj(e+ cj − djXj)
∂dj
)
fi(e+ ci − diXi) de
=
∫ ∞
0
fj(e+ cj − djXj)(−Xj)fi(e+ ci − diXi) de
= −Xj
∫ ∞
0
fj(e+ cj − djXj)fi(e+ ci − diXi) de
(69)
The right hand side of (69) is clearly negative, as the integrand (product of two PDFs) is positive and
Xj ∈ {0, 1}. Thus,
∂
∂dj
p(Y = i|Xi, Xj) ≤ 0 ∀ dj (70)
(68) and (70) complete the proof.
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A.4 Proof of Lemma 4: One-to-one correspondence of m-ADC choice criteria
Assertion: Given a set of response probabilities pr0 = Pr0 , r ∈ {0, . . . ,m + 1}, and any solution set
C = {cj : j ∈ {0, . . . ,m + 1}} comprising ordered sets of choice criteria satisfying the system (13).
There is a one-to-one mapping between any choice criterion ci and its complement set C ′i = {cj : j ∈
{0, . . . ,m+ 1}, j 6= i}.
Proof: The proof proceeds in two steps, first demonstrating the mapping φ : C ′i 7→ ci, and then its
inverse φ : ci 7→ C ′i.
First, consider the probability p00 = P00 . A given choice criterion ci, i ∈ {0, . . . ,m+1} can be expressed
in terms of the remaining criteria in the following way.
P00 =
m+1∏
j=1
Fj(cj) (71)
ci = F
−1
i (
P00∏m+1
j=1,j 6=i Fj(cj)
) (72)
where Fi is invertible because it is monotonic (being a cumulative density function). Given a particular
p00 = P00 , and a solution set ofm criteria {cj : j ∈ 0, . . . ,m+ 1, j 6= i} the remaining criterion ci is uniquely
determined, thus demonstrating the mapping φ : C ′i 7→ ci.
Next, consider the set of probabilities p(Y = i| ‖X‖1 = 0) = Pi0. From system (13), these can be
written as:
Pi0 =
∫ ∞
ci
m+1∏
k=1,k 6=i
Fk(ei − ci + ck) fi(ei) dei (73)
With the substitution e = ei − ci, and following some algebra (see 50), this set of equations can be
rewritten as:
Pi0 =
∫ ∞
0
m+1∏
k=1,k 6=i
Fk(e+ ck) fi(e+ ci) de (74)
Let C be a set of criteria {cj : j ∈ {0, . . . ,m + 1}} that satisfies this equation. Let us assume that
one of the criteria in this set, say cm+1 (without loss of generality) has a known value.
Define the following functions (for i ∈ 0, . . . ,m).
Fµ(e; cm+1) = [Fm+1(e+ cm+1)]
1
m (75)
Gi(e+ ci; cm+1) = Fi(e+ ci) Fµ(e; cm+1) (76)
We note that both Fµ and Gi are parameterized by cm+1. Fµ, the m-th root of a cumulative density
function, and G, the product of Fµ and Fi are both monotonic, continuous functions, and it is easy to
see that lim
e→−∞Gi = 0; lime→+∞Gi = 1. Thus, Gi is itself a cumulative density function with the following
probability density:
gi(e+ ci; cm+1) =
∂G
∂e
(77)
= Fi(e+ ci)
∂Fµ(e; cm+1)
∂e
+ Fµ(e; cm+1) fi(e+ ci) (78)
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Now, let us consider the following system of equations:
Qi =
∫ ∞
0
m∏
k=1,k 6=i
Gk(e+ ck; cm+1) gi(e+ ci; cm+1) de (79)
With some algebra, we can show that Qi = Pi0 + (Pm+10 /m).
By the induction hypothesis for m-equations, given a set of qi-s, and the parameter cm+1, all of
the ck-s are uniquely determined. Because cm+1 was an arbitrarily chosen criterion, the result can be
generalized as follows: given a set of Qi-s, and any choice criterion ci, all of the other choice criteria in
C ′i = {cj : j ∈ {0, . . . ,m+ 1}, j 6= i}-s are uniquely determined, thus demonstrating the inverse mapping
φ−1 : ci 7→ C ′i.
Thus, we prove the one-to-one mapping among any one choice criterion, and the remaining criteria,
ci ↔ C ′i.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 5: Direct variation among all criteria in the m-ADC
task
Assertion: Given a set of response probabilities Pi0, i ∈ 1, . . . ,m+ 1 and the set of all solution sets
{Ck = {cjk : j ∈ 0, . . . ,m+ 1}} comprising ordered sets of choice criteria satisfying the system (13).
For any two solution sets C1 and C2 every pair of corresponding elements (cj1, cj2) obeys the same order
relation i.e. if any ci1 ≷ ci2 then every cj1 ≷ cj2, i, j ∈ 0, . . . ,m+ 1.
Proof: Let C1 = {cj1 : j ∈ 0, . . . ,m+ 1} be a solution set of criteria satisfying the system (13), and
let C2 = {cj2 : j ∈ 0, . . . ,m+ 1} be another, distinct (not identical) solution set. Also let all choice
criteria from set C1, except that corresponding to choice i (ci), be greater (or lesser) in value than the
corresponding criteria in set C2. We demonstrate that in this case, the criterion ci in set C1 must also
be greater (or lesser) in value than the corresponding criterion in set C2.
Given the probability of a Go response to choice i during catch trials, this can be written as (74):
Pi0 =
∫ ∞
0
m+1∏
j=1,j 6=i
Fj(e+ cj
1) fi(e+ ci
1) de (80)
=
∫ ∞
0
m+1∏
j=1,j 6=i
Fj(e+ cj
2) fi(e+ ci
2) de
Note that if cj1 ≷ cj2,
m+1∏
j=1,j 6=i
Fj(e+ cj
1) ≷
m+1∏
j=1,j 6=i
Fj(e+ cj
2) ∀e (81)
as the Fj-s are monotonically increasing functions of their arguments. Hence, for the right hand sides
of equation (A.5) to be equal to each other (and each equal to Pi0) ci1 ≷ ci2. The latter result is confirmed
by inspecting the integrands of equation (), and is also evident from the following lemma.
Lemma 8 The response probability pi0 is a strictly (monotonically) increasing function of
cj and a strictly (monotonic) decreasing function of ci.
The lemma is proved in a subsequent section. Thus, if every cj1 ≷ cj2, j ∈ 0, . . .m+ 1, j 6= i then,
ci
1 ≷ ci2.
However, we have just shown that there is a one-to-one mapping between each ci and its complement
set C ′i = {cj : j ∈ {0, . . . ,m + 1}, j 6= i}. Thus, the converse statement must also hold: that is, if
ci
1 ≷ ci2, then every cj1 ≷ cj2, j ∈ 0, . . .m, j ∈ {0, . . . ,m+ 1}, j 6= i. This completes the proof.
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A.6 Proof of Lemma 6: Inverse variation among at least a pair of criteria in
the m-ADC task
Assertion: Given a set of response probabilities P00 and the set of all solution sets {Ck = {cjk : j ∈
0, . . . ,m+ 1}} comprising ordered sets of choice criteria satisfying the system (13). For any two solution
sets C1 and C2 at least one pair of corresponding elements (cj1, cj2) differs in its order relation i.e. if
any ci1 ≷ ci2, i ∈ 0, . . . ,m+ 1 then at least one cj1 ≶ cj2.
Proof: Let C1 = {cj1 : j ∈ 0, . . . ,m+ 1} and C2 = {cj2 : j ∈ 0, . . . ,m+ 1} be distinct solution sets of
criteria satisfying the system (13). Also let any one choice criterion from set C1, corresponding to choice
i (ci), be greater in value than the corresponding criterion in set C2 i.e. ci1 > ci2.
We prove the result by contradiction. Assume that none of the other criteria in set C1 is lesser than
the corresponding criteria in set C2. In other words, every cj1 ≥ cj2, j ∈ 0, . . .m+ 1.
Given the probability of a NoGo response during catch trials, this can be written as:
P00 =
m+1∏
j=1
Fj(cj
1) =
m+1∏
j=1
Fj(cj
2) (82)
The functions Fj are monotonic functions of their arguments. If every cj1 ≥ cj2 equality of the right
hand side expressions holds only if cj1 = cj2, which violates the assumption that C1 and C2 are non-
identical sets. Thus, if any one ci1 > ci2, the assumption that none of the other criteria in set C1 is lesser
than the corresponding criteria in set C2 leads to a contradiction. Hence, if any ci1 > ci2, i ∈ 0, . . . ,m+ 1
then at least one criterion in set C1 has to be lesser than the corresponding criterion in set C2.
It is easy to see that the converse is also true, i.e. if any ci1 < ci2, i ∈ 0, . . . ,m+ 1 then at least one
criterion in set C1 has to be greater than the corresponding criterion in set C2. This completes the proof.
A.7 Proof of Lemma 7: Monotonic variation of m-ADC response probabili-
ties with perceptual sensitivity
Assertion: The response probability pij is a strictly monotonic (increasing) function of di and a strictly
monotonic (decreasing) function of dj .
Proof: We reproduce the system of equations (6) for reference:
pij =
∫ ∞
ci−diXi
m∏
k=1,k 6=i
Fk(ei + diXi − dkXk − ci + ck) fi(ei) dei (83)
Consider the probability of response to location i when the stimulus is presented at the same location
(Xi = 1, Xk = 0 ∀ k 6= i).
pii =
∫ ∞
ci−di
m∏
k=1,k 6=i
Fk(ei + di − ci + ck) fi(ei) dei (84)
With increasing di, the response probability pii has to increase, as the integrand increases with di
(each Fk is a monotonically increasing function of its argument), and the integration (positive integrand)
occurs over a larger domain (ci − di decreases).
Next, consider the probability of response to location i when the stimulus is presented at location
j, j 6= i (Xj = 1, Xk = 0∀k 6= j).
pij =
∫ ∞
ci
m∏
k=1,k 6=i,j
Fk(ei − ci + ck)Fj(ei − dj − ci + cj) fi(ei) dei (85)
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Again, it is apparent that with increasing dj the response probability pij has to decrease, as the integrand
(Fj(ei − dj − ci + cj), specifically) decreases with increasing dj (the domain of integration is unaffected
by dj).
This completes the proof. The assertion can be proved analytically by quantifying the change in
response probabilities with perceptual sensitivity following a procedure similar to that of Lemma 3.
A.8 Proof of Lemma 8: Monotonic variation of m-ADC response probabili-
ties with choice criteria
Assertion: The response probability pi0 is a strictly monotonic (decreasing) function of ci and a strictly
monotonic (increasing) function of cj .
Proof: Consider the probability of response to location i when the no stimulus is presented (Xk = 0∀k).
pi0 =
∫ ∞
ci
m∏
k=1,k 6=i
Fk(ei − ci + ck) fi(ei) dei (86)
With increasing ci, the response probability pi0 has to decrease as the integrand decreases with ci (each
Fk a monotonically decreases with ci), and the integration (positive integrand) occurs over a smaller
domain. Similarly, with increasing cj , pi0 has to increase as the integrand (Fj(ei − ci + cj), specifically)
increases with cj .
This completes the proof. The analytical demonstration by quantifying the changes in response
probabilities with choice criteria follows a procedure similar to that of Lemma 2.
B The m-AFC model with bias as a special case of the m-ADC
model
In the m-ADC model, if the decision variable never falls below the criterion at any location, the subject
never provides a NoGo response. This can be achieved by setting the criteria to very low (large negative)
values. In this case the m-ADC model is identical with an m-AFC model, assuming no catch trials are
incorporated in the task design.
Formally, the m-ADC model reduces to the m-AFC model in the limit ci → −∞ (Figure 7A vs. 7B)
while preserving the difference between every pair of criteria ci − cj = bij , which we term the bias for
location j relative to location i. Applying this limit to equation (6):
p(Y = i|X) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∏
k,k 6=i
Fk(ei + diXi − dkXk − bik) fi(ei) dei (87)
These equations describe a recently developed m-AFC model formulation that incorporates bias [15].
Thus, the m-ADC model is a more general form of the m-AFC model and the analytical results we have
proved above for the m-ADC model are all valid for the m-AFC model (with bias) as well.
